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As some of North Africa’s original inhabitants, the indigenous Amazigh population in 
Morocco and Algeria has withstood waves of invaders to retain a distinct cultural and 
linguistic identity that has persisted within—and despite—nearly fourteen centuries of 
Arab rule. The emergence of Morocco and Algeria as modern nation-states following 
their independence marked the beginning of an ongoing tension between each state and 
its ethnic Amazigh minorities. With one state (i.e., Morocco) more inclusive and 
progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary (i.e., Algeria), what are the 
factors that explain the different outcomes in both states?    
This study compares the two movements in Algeria and Morocco by investigating 
the relative salience of two central variables—that of each state’s institutions and the 
behavior of its movements—on the outcomes for the Amazigh community. The major 
finding is that state institutions stand as the most potent variable due to their ability to 
channel movement strategies towards either militancy or accommodation. This power is 
largely illustrated through Morocco’s reliance on cooptation as an initial response to 
expressions of grievance that has produced a milder form of activism. In contrast, Algeria 
has defaulted to a more repressive approach (to any dissent) that has produced a strident 
activism with radical offshoots. Movement behavior continues to play a secondary role 
that largely hinges on its ability to use globalization as an amplifying and mobilizing 
instrument for international pressure.  
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
As ancient inhabitants of North Africa, the Amazigh populace has survived more 
than a millennium of invasions and oscillating regime policies.1  Over the centuries their 
identity has oscillated between a proud ethnic one, a dormant marginalized one, an 
insular tribal one and one struggling for its voice in society. Their ability to survive and 
to maintain a distinct ethnic and linguistic identity throughout it all has largely been a 
product of negotiations and interactions with ruling regimes and an ability to balance an 
ethos of fierce resistance (and independence) with an evolving concept of their own 
group identity. These group identities (i.e., the regional Amazigh tribes unique to Algeria 
and Morocco) have remained in various degrees of tension with a gradually developing 
Arab-Islamic identity since the Arab invasion in the seventh century (see Figure 1 for a 
map of Amazigh groups in the two states today).   During the battle for colonial 
independence, the Amazigh consistently fought against the French and Spanish 
occupiers. After independence, however, these two states each embraced unique forms of 
government and experienced subsequent, but varied, periods of political instability and 
violence due to regime changes and rebellion. Throughout this process, Islamism (i.e., 
political Islam) developed and emerged as a major movement while a collective national 
identity superseded the Amazigh one for several decades. This substrata Amazigh 
identity existed only passively until the rise of identity politics in the 1970s. With the 
advent of globalization, an increasingly mobilized Amazigh movement would actively 
pursue language objectives beginning in the 1990s and continuing into the new century. 
                                                
1 Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East: A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, 2nd 
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Figure 1.  Map of Moroccan and Algerian Amazigh groups (From Leclerc, 2006) 
In Morocco today, the Amazigh movement remains strong but divided. King 
Mohammed VI’s July 2001 creation of l’Institut Royal de Culture Amazighe (IRCAM) has 
created a split that still exists today with many members of the Amazigh Cultural Movement 
(MCA) refusing to participate in what they view as the monarchy’s attempt to co-opt and 
temper their movement.2 Politically, Amazigh activists have increasingly rejected the loyalist 
Mouvement Populaire (MP); the most radical activists forming the Parti Democratique 
Amazighe Marocaine (PDAM) in 2005. This party was eventually banned by the Moroccan 
judiciary as illegal due to legislative prohibitions on regional or ethnic political parties.3  
After the widespread protests fueled by the Arab Spring’s success in neighboring Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya, the movement won recognition of Tamazight as an official language 
alongside Arabic. Even this victory remains a subject of controversy with some in the 
                                                
2 As Maddy-Weitzman points out, the MCA is the Moroccan version of the older Berber Cultural 
Movement (MCB) that originated in Algeria. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Ethno-Politics and Globalization 
in North Africa: The Berber Culture Movement,” Journal of North African Studies 11, no. 1 (March 2006): 
81. 
3 Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from 
Independence to the Arab Spring (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 220–222. 
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movement lambasting it as only a token concession by the palace and part of a broader (and 
successful) effort to weaken the February 20th movement.4   
Despite being overwhelmingly concentrated in the Kabylie region of Algeria, the 
Mouvement Culturel Berbère (MCB) has been consistent in its longtime advocacy for 
linguistic and cultural recognition of Imazighen as a whole versus Kabylie regionally. 
This national outlook is not monolithic, though, in 2001 Kabyle singer and activist Ferhat 
Mehenni created the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie (MAK). The MAK asserts 
that because the MCB and long-time Amazigh-supported opposition political parties 
(e.g., Front des Forces Socialistes [FFS] and Rassemblement pour la Culture Democratie 
[RCD]) have all failed in effecting reform within the Algerian state as a whole, the focus 
should shift for reform at the regional level. Based in Paris, however, the MAK remains 
an outlier, especially due to its radical pro-Israel stance. Overall, the Amazigh movement 
in Algeria remains hamstrung in its efforts to promote a national agenda by its weak 
regional political base and geographic seclusion. The future of the movement may hinge 
on its ability to leverage its demands for recognition of its cultural and linguistic 
autonomy with an agreement to cooperate in pursuing burgeoning Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) forces in the mountainous Kabylie regions.5  
The past 40 years have witnessed considerable struggles for the sizable Amazigh 
minority populations in both states. There is an opportunity to investigate the outcomes of 
these struggles vis-a-vis the Algerian and Moroccan state policies. This examination of 
state-movement relations may explain the two different outcomes for Amazigh 
populations in both states as affected by the state institutions. With one state (i.e., 
Morocco) more inclusive and progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary 
(i.e., Algeria), what are the factors that explain the different outcomes in both states?   
Since the emergence of an Amazigh group identity in the late 1970s through the Arab 
Spring to 2012, has one factor been most influential and emerged most consistently, or 
are the explanations specific to time and state?   This thesis seeks to identify and analyze 
                                                
4 “North Africa’s Berbers Get Boost from Arab Spring,” The Cortez Journal, May 5, 2012, http:// 
www.cortezjournal.com/. 
5 Willis, Politics and Power, 223–225. 
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the factors (i.e., the nature of the state institutions, the nature of the movement behavior, 
or some combination of the two) that influence Algerian and Moroccan state interactions 
with their Amazigh minority populations.  
Finally, the nomenclature used to describe the Amazigh—or Berber—populace is 
one of much debate. There is not widespread consensus among activists, scholars, or 
historians as to which term (i.e., Amazigh or Berber) is most appropriate. Much of this 
opacity is due to a lack of clarity as to the origin of the term berber.  14th century scholar 
and historian Ibn Khaldun claims the name Berber was given to the group by a raiding 
Yemeni king named Qays B. Sayfi (who lived during “the time of Moses or somewhat 
earlier”). After he heard some of its members speak, the king demanded to know what 
their barbarah (i.e., their unintelligible language) was.6  Others claim the term is derived 
from the Greek term barbaros, meaning “foreign, strange, ignorant.”  In Sanskrit, the 
term Barbara meant “stammering” or “non-Aryan.”  Regardless, the term for many 
carries a definite pejorative and subservient tone due to its use by successive waves of 
conquering forces (i.e., Romans, Vandals, Byzantines and Arabs).7  These negative 
implications are easily avoided through the use of the term Amazigh that translates 
literally as “free man.”  The term Imazighen is the plural form of the noun. The term 
Tamazgha describes their land, and Tamazight the Amazigh language in a generic, 
general sense (specific geographically-based dialects will be delineated accordingly). In 
order to prevent any unnecessary offense, this thesis will use the Tamazight terms 
whenever possible or practical.8 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis will produce meaningful conclusions concerning state-movement 
interactions in Morocco and Algeria. These conclusions will serve as a theoretical 
contribution to current scholarship on the Amazigh identity and the movement’s level of 
influence within the context of the state, as well as a more general contribution to existing 
                                                
6 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqadimmah,an Introduction to History, ed. and trans. Franz Rosenthal (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1958), 21–22.   
7 Online Etymology Dictionary. last accessed April 5, 2012, http://www.etymonline.com/.  
8 The letters “gh” are pronounced in the same manner as the French letter “r” in the Paris.   
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literature on ethnic conflict and its resolution within the state. Determining the specific 
factors that produced specific outcomes for the Imazighen in each state historically can 
serve as a guide to analyze future Amazigh-state interactions. Furthermore, by providing 
a complete framework (i.e., from the historical interactions to the accompanying causal 
factors to the specific outcomes) this thesis will stand as an instrument for a “thicker,” 
more holistic analysis of other similar ethnic minorities in the future. 
In addition, the undercurrent to this examination of Amazigh-state relations is the 
rise and success of Islamism (i.e., political Islam). Often misunderstood due to its 
complexity, political Islam as a potential opponent to liberal democracy remains a 
widespread concern for the international community nonetheless. Radical Islamism (i.e., 
violent political Islam) then stands as an immediate and direct concern for the West due 
to its essentialist ideology and rejection of pluralist and democratic ideals. Most notably, 
understanding the factors that affected the social and political outcomes for Amazigh 
populations in Algeria and Morocco allows one to analyze the efficacy and plausibility of 
the Amazigh identity as a counterweight to, or a tempering agent for, Islamism.   As 
Michael Willis observes, this counterweight notion derives from the salience of the Arab 
identity and its language as predominant, and minority identities and languages as 
marginal within Islam—this importance standing in direct tension with the Amazigh 
movement in Maghrib politics.9  This tension is then further aggravated because 
Imazighen tend to be seen as pluralistic, strongly embracing an identity that puts each 
state’s point of origin (i.e., as a nation)—not with the Arab-Islamic conquest but with the 
indigenous Amazigh people of the greater Maghreb region. A measured evaluation of this 
issue will have geostrategic implications for increasing stability within the Maghrib. 
Evidence of this geostrategic importance is seen in Algeria’s Kabylie region—a longtime 
stronghold of AQIM due to its economic destitution and geographic isolation—where 
Imazighen have recently begun cooperating with government security forces to oust Al 
Qaeda from the region.10  
                                                
9Willis, Politics and Power, 217–220. 
10 Alexis Arieff, Algeria: Current Issues, CRS Report RL21532 (Washington, DC: Library of 
Congress, Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2013.    
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The arrival of French colonial forces to North Africa sparked a near fetishistic 
fascination with regard to the Amazigh people. As the French presence grew in the 19th 
century, scholars and physicians produced an outpouring of literature that depicted the 
Amazigh as a race distinct from, and above, the savage Arabs—ironic considering many 
believe the term Berber to be derived from the moniker, barbarian. The dominant 
medical personality in 1830’s Algeria was its chief army surgeon and professor of 
medicine Lucien Baudens. He would expound upon the courage and perseverance of the 
Kabyle Amazigh in contrast to the “cupidity, cruelty and fanaticism” of the Arabs in the 
widely read Revue de Paris (1838).11  Physician Eugene Bodichon would add to this 
characterization in his 1845 account of the Algerian colonial situation, Considerations 
sur l’Algérie. This description would deride the Arabs as void of any redeeming qualities 
while extoling the Imazighen as a “pure primitive race” with an innate understanding of 
honor and truth.12  While these accounts and other were specific to Algeria, they were 
endemic of the rise and acceptance of French pseudo-scientific racism prevalent 
throughout France and institutionalized within the Societé d’Anthropologie de Paris.13 
Contemporary writing on the Imazighen has diverged from its ignominious roots 
and has produced an impressive body of works for such a (relatively) small ethnicity.14  
In order to comprehensively address this research question, a dual track approach will be 
used to examine two separate bodies of work. First, an examination of the literature 
specific to the Amazigh will show the highlights and shortcomings concerning analysis of 
Amazigh-state movement relations. Then, a canvas of the literature specific to ethnic 
conflict will be made, paying particular attention to the analysis of the methods states use 
to deal with ethnic minorities.   
                                                
11 Patricia M. E. Lorcin, “Imperialism, Colonial Identity, and Race in Algeria, 1830–1870: The Role 
of the French Medical Corps,” ISIS 90, no. 4 (1999), 661–2. 
12 Ibid., 667–9.   
13 Ibid., 672–4. 
14 Most estimates place the proportion of Berbers at 40% in Morocco and 25% in Algeria, with 
Berber-speaking populations of approximately 10 million and 6 million, respectively, in each state. 
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1. Moroccan and Algerian Imazighen 
Significant scholarship accompanied the reemergence of the Amazigh movement 
with the rise of identity politics in the 1970s. The most significant work being Ernest 
Gellner and Charles Micaud’s compendium of scholarly essays entitled Arabs and 
Berbers (1973).   While not directly addressing the issue of state interactions with their 
Amazigh populations, the work is important because it addresses the very existence and 
identity of the Amazigh people. An inflammatory notion today, Arabs and Berbers 
refuted the idea of the Imazighen as an ethnicity, instead asserting that they were more 
likely to identify themselves as members of a tribe or region, or as part of the greater 
Islamic ummah (i.e., religious community).15   Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Katherine 
Hoffman persuasively refute this notion as they describe the rise of the Amazigh Culture 
Movement and its transnational ethno-cultural awareness. This movement fits well into 
Benedict Anderson’s framework of an imagined community—not in the pejorative 
sense—but as a group of people espousing a common memory, history, culture and 
territory. Furthermore, the scope of Gellner and Micaud’s work focused on “structuralism 
and segmentary theory” whereas the contemporary writing focuses on “historiographical 
and qualitative studies.”16 
Michael Willis takes issue with two commonly offered explanations for the rise of 
the Amazigh identity—external (i.e., western states attempting to weaken Arab power 
and unity) and internal (i.e., the emergence of the Amazigh identity as the result of 
centuries of struggle under Arab dominance). Instead he argues the Amazigh identity to 
be an evolutionary one often based as much on self-perception as reality. Maddy-
Weitzman casts doubts as to the veracity of a centuries-long struggle Amazigh narrative 
but acknowledges that this Amazigh “memory work” has been indelibly written and that 
                                                
15 Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah Fernández, North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of 
Transformation (London: Routledge, 2008), 227–8; Ernest Gellner, “Political and Religious Organization 
of the Berbers of the Central High Atlas,” in Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa, ed. 
Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 59–66. 
16 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, The Berber Identity Movement and the Challenge to North African States, 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011), 7–8; Katherine E. Hoffman and Susan Gilson Miller, Berbers 
and Others: Beyond Tribe and Nation in the Maghrib (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 
 1–3.; Willis, Politics and Power, 206–7. 
 8 
while an overreaction, it was necessary to combat the original dearth of Amazigh 
presence in the written history of either nation.17  In the Imazighen’s case they rose 
among the perfect congruence of a global explosion of identity movements and sweeping 
Arabization policies and movements.18 
Willis argues that the nature of the state affected the Amazigh outcome most 
shortly after colonial independence in the two states. In Algeria, the state language policy 
shaped early state-movement interaction whereas this friction was minimalized in 
Morocco through a concerted effort by the makhzen to coopt Amazigh military 
leadership.19  In 1980s Algeria, Willis argues that the primary influencing factor wavered 
between the nature of the Amazigh movement and the nature of their economy.   Initially 
elite-driven, the Amazigh movement was adamant in pushing for pluralist policies.   This 
pluralism, however, was less driven by an identity specific to the Imazighen and more 
driven by relative economic deprivation (e.g., the majority of the 2001 El-Kseur platform 
demands were for state-wide socioeconomic equity and freedom).20  In Morocco, the 
monarchy used the perception of pluralism from the onset, co-opting Amazigh notables 
to counter-balance nationalist power within the Istiqlal Party (PI). Willis argues that in 
Morocco the primary influencing factor for the Amazigh outcome was the nature of the 
international movements, with their geographic incontiguity as a secondary one. These 
identity movements affected Moroccan perceptions, driving a flourishing of elite and 
urban Amazigh associations through the first decade of the 2000s. The geographic 
isolation of some Amazigh groups (specifically those in the Middle Atlas mountains), 
however, dampened the strength of the movement as a whole.21  
Silverstein and Crawford argue that in Morocco, the Amazigh outcome largely 
derives from the co-optive nature of the state. They observe that prior to the creation of 
                                                
17 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, ed., Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics,  
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007). 
18 Zoubir and Fernández, North Africa, 229–231. 
19 The makhzen refers to a rural-elite alliance centered around the Moroccan monarchy; it is the center 
of all decision-making in Morocco. For more on its role see Malika Zeghal’s Islamism in Morocco.   
20 Willis, Politics and Power, 218–219. 
21 Ibid., 218–220. 
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l’Institut Royal de Culture Amazigh (IRCAM), mainstream Moroccans viewed Amazigh 
culture as a colonial invention. However, in Morocco’s case the nature of the state had a 
direct effect on the nature of the movement, splintering off a more radical group that 
viewed the Jews’ tribulations as the struggles of a kindred spirit.22  Nisan tackles the idea 
of cooptation from a different angle, describing the way in which Islam was able to coopt 
the Imazighen in a manner that the Romans, Vandals and Byzantines never were able to 
do. He points to language as the single largest factor affecting the Amazigh identity—the 
lack of a common unified spoken and written language rendered the Imazighen unable to 
resist cooptation in Morocco and engendered bitterness in Algeria where the government 
stripped the central tenet of their identity with repressive policies. Maddy-Weitzman 
argues that the nature of the state was affected by a brutal colonial period that produced a 
regime necessarily focused on its unity as an Arab nation—not on distinctive and unique 
ethnic identities.23     
Moroccan scholar Michael Peyron’s 2010 chastisement of fellow Amazigh 
scholars likely oversteps and devolves into minutiae, however, he is persuasive in calling 
for more complete research into French and Arab primary sources documents in concert 
with more fieldwork. He argues that rectification of this deficiency could prevent many 
misunderstandings about the Amazigh identity. He notes that some scholars have 
incorrectly asserted that izerf (i.e., Amazigh customary law) and shari’a have been so 
long intertwined that they are essentially the same. To the contrary he references research 
that shows the regret expressed by Atlas Imazighen at the diminishment of the izerf. 
Another common example centers on incorrect assertions by academics as to the origin of 
the 1930 Dahir Berbère. He notes that the PI actually coined this term and that it was a 
reworking of an earlier 1914 text that pertained to specific pacified Amazigh areas 
drafted by Resident-General of Morocco Hubert Lyautey.24 
                                                
22 Paul Silverstein and David Crawford, “Amazigh Activism and the Moroccan State,” MER: Middle 
East Report, no. 233 (2004). 
23 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities: Berbers, ‘Berberism’ and the State in North 
Africa,” The Journal of North African Studies 6, no. 3 (2001): 36–8. 
24 Michael Peyron, “Recent Cases of Incomplete Academic Research on Morocco’s Berbers,” The 
Journal of North African Studies 15, no. 2 (2010), 157–171. 
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2. Nations and States 
Central to the state-movement relations is the tension between nations and state. 
Traditionally, a nation is defined in a quantifiable manner such as, “a community of 
people characterized by a common, language, territory, religion.”25  This community of 
people can also be labeled an ethnicity. Politics (in this case) then is the drawing of the 
geographic borders for this nation. This defining of borders typically transforms a nation 
into a state. It was these types of nationalist tendencies that drove much of the movement 
for colonial independence in Algeria and France. Post-independence, the state in both 
cases made an assertion of nation-statehood (the coincidence of ethnicity and geographic 
borders) due to an authoritarian assumption of ethno-linguistic homogeneity. Rather than 
a structuralist reasoning, this assumption stemmed from a more primordialist argument of 
a psychological glue that both bound and distinguished their populations through a shared 
Arab-Islamic blood (or at least the perception of it).26  In both cases these official and 
unspoken policies meant the exclusion, suppression, or expulsion of the identities of 
various ethnic minorities (e.g., Jews and Imazighen) living within the borders of the state. 
These state interactions with ethnic minority populations are central to ethnic conflict 
studies. Examining the relevant literature then is paramount to understanding Amazigh-
state movement relations. 
3. Ethnic Conflict Literature 
In most cases, the mere presence of an ethnic minority is a harbinger for ethnic 
conflict within a state. Much of the predominant theory focuses on relative economic and 
political deprivation as an explanation for ethnic conflict. Marie Besançon argues that the 
more unequal economically that ethnic groups are, the lower the probability of ethnic 
violence but much higher the chance of revolution. He further argues that the more 
unequal the educational opportunities, the lower the chance of revolution, but the higher 
                                                
25 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 197. 
26 Ibid. 
 11 
the chance of ethnic conflict.27  In Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 
Walker Connor takes case with this prevailing assumption that economic inequality 
drives ethnic conflict and proffers political deprivation as a more comprehensive 
explanation.  Regardless of the argument, the bulk of evidence is circumstantial and local 
with scant evidence to show a pervasive and broad causal (not just correlative) 
relationship between inequality and ethnic conflict. This incomplete argument must be 
acknowledged then when evaluating Amazigh access to the economic, educational and 
political system. An additional difficulty is present in Morocco and Algeria with varying 
degrees of political access (in terms of ability to influence meaningful change) for any 
member of society, regardless of ethnicity, due to the authoritarian nature of the regime 
(i.e., with all the true decision-making cemented in the makhzen and le Pouvoir).28   
Shifting from drivers of ethnic conflict, it is fundamental to examine state 
solutions to these real and perceived differences. State options in dealing with ethnic 
minority grievances run the gambit: from genocide to expulsion to assimilation to 
integration to multiculturalism to partition to secession. Bell-Fialkoff opines that states 
most often embrace policies such as expulsion and ethnic cleansing with politically 
unreliable or dangerous populations.29  While both states likely employed this policy 
against their Jewish inhabitants after independence, the regimes never viewed the 
Amazigh populations in this manner. Thus, the majority of state-Amazigh policies over 
the last three decades have fallen into the assimilation/integration/multiculturalism 
categories.   
The Amazigh movement’s struggle is one that wavers between the goal of some 
form of measured political/legal/lingual autonomy (with the exception of smaller radical 
groups such as the MAK that seek regional autonomy) and multi-culturalism.30  In the 
                                                
27 Marie L. Besançon, “Relative Resources: Inequality in Ethnic Wars, Revolutions, and Genocides,” 
Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 4 (2005), 393–415. 
28 Le Pouvoir literally translates as “those who are able to do” and refers to the political-military 
complex that controls power in Algeria.   
29 Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993), 111. 
30 Al Jazeera, “Berbers in North Africa,” last modified January 23, 2010, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2010/01/2010121125817226470.html 
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case of state-Amazigh movement relations, this tension and conflict is most firmly vested 
in lingual identity.   
While assimilation is most often associated with immigrant populations, it holds 
relevance for indigenous (or close to it) populations as well, as Nathan Glazer shows in 
his examination of the failure of assimilation with regard to African-Americans in the 
United States.31  Alba and Nee write that assimilation can be defined as the decline, and 
at its endpoint, the disappearance of an ethnic and racial distinction and the cultural and 
social differences that express it.32  For a long period this was the policy of the United 
States until it shifted to a more accepting (of cultural specificities) multi-culturalist one. 
As Herbert Gans points out, key to this debate is whether assimilation can actually be 
equated with social mobility—he argues that the two are still independent processes.33  
As Glaser argues, assimilation policies are nearly universally disdained and for good 
reason—they value the imposition an ethnocentric and patronizing framework over 
retention of cultural and ethnic integrity.34   Thus, a state most often seeks to assimilate a 
group in an effort to consolidate power and promote stability as occurred most often in 
Algeria.   
A more progressive policy was seen in Morocco as it shifted from early 
assimilative and expulsionary (i.e., the expelling of undesirables) policies toward a state 
policy of integration. This policy differs from assimilation in that with it the state seeks to 
combine two identities into one (e.g., Amazigh identity as an essential component of 
Moroccan identity).   As Eiki Berg and Guy Ben-Porat point out, states can use 
integration to de-territorialize conflicts and accommodate an ethnic minority, although 
this is typically done in democracies (a term whose assignation to the political system in 
                                                
31 Nathan Glazer, “Is Assimilation Dead?” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 530 (1993): 122–136. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Herbert J Gans, “Acculturation, Assimilation and Mobility,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 1 
(2007), 152–164. 
34 Richard Alba and Victor Nee, “Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration,” 
International Migration Review 31, no. 4 (Winter, 1997): 826–827. 
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Algeria or Morocco would be highly suspect).35  Multiculturalism leaps beyond mere 
integration and acknowledges an ethnicity and culture in the political and public sphere—
notably this denotes a linguistic acknowledgement. Typically states employ this policy 
when the costs (i.e., political and economic) of “eliminating the difference” (i.e., the 
unique identity of an ethnic minority) become too high.36  These costs can be the political 
pressure stemming from a movement’s mobilization or it can be a desire or need for a 
regime to increase its economic output. As David Laitin points out, the mobilization for 
linguistic autonomy (even in poor states) tend be the least violent form of ethnic protest 
and when properly managed by the state can foster economic growth.37 
The instrumentalist theory of nationalism—that insists a specific person’s choices 
and actions can and do matter—must be acknowledged as it pertains heavily to the 
leadership personalities in Morocco and Algeria. As Elie Kedourie argues, leaders use 
nationalism as a tool to give order to the cacophony of competing political authorities.38  
Certainly this was done during the colonial independence movements in Algeria and 
Morocco as its leaders sought to promote stability and order amidst a potential political 
vacuum.   While instrumentalist Brendan O’Leary has been criticized for assigning too 
much power to the elites and their ability to sway the masses, this criticism is less valid in 
more authoritarian regimes where the masses are mostly disenfranchised from the 
political process.39  Michael Hechter argues that rational actors will respond to 
institutional solutions.40  This hypothesis is important in comparing state interactions 
with Amazigh movement as they ultimately seek to maintain control and authority over 
their populace. 
                                                
35 Eiki Berg and Guy Ben-Porat. “Introduction: Partition vs. Power-sharing?” Nations and 
Nationalism 14 (2008): 29–37. 
36 David D. Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 112–115.   
37 Ibid.,133–34.   
38 Elie Kedourie, Nationalism in Asia and Africa (New York: World Publishing, 1970), 28. 
39 Brendan O’Leary, Nationality and Nationalism: Instrumentalist Theories of Nationalism (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 148–152. 
40 Michael Hechter, “Nationalism and Rationality,” Studies in Comparative International 
Development 35, no. 1 (2000), 3–19. 
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Marc Howard Ross argues that the most effective solutions to ethnic conflict are 
found in comprehensive institutional solutions.41  For such a solution to be 
comprehensive, though, it requires a rewriting and reworking of psychocultural 
narratives, symbols and dramas to find a common identity.   Clark McCauley aptly 
captures the reasoning and goal of such a rewriting: “the psychological foundation of 
ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflict is group identification—an emotional attachment to 
a political group. The individual feels part of a group of people who are willing to 
sacrifice for the group . . . the group must recognize mutual feeling for their nation.”42   
This observation captures well the ongoing struggle of ethnic and national identity in 
Algeria and Morocco.   
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
At the most basic level this paper seeks to determine the reason that the 
interactions of two largest states in North Africa with their minority Amazigh populations 
produced different outcomes. The underlying assumption then asserts that important 
differences exist between the two states—both in regimes themselves and in their 
indigenous Amazigh populations.   
My primary hypothesis is that it is the nature of each state’s institutions and 
accompanying political system that most affects the outcome for its ethnic minority. 
There is consensus that from the onset Morocco has been more pluralistic politically, 
employing a primary strategy of cooptation through the structure of the makhzen.   Rather 
than ever completely eliminating threats to the monarchy, the Moroccan kings have 
instead played palace opponents off one another to reduce each opponent’s power. 
Repression and bribery remains a secondary instrument for unruly opposition. For 
Moroccan Imazighen this has meant a series of graduated concessions of questionable 
value and sincerity. In contrast, Algeria was not initially politically pluralistic and it has 
                                                
41 Marc Howard Ross, Culture and Belonging in Divided Societies: Contestation and Symbolic 
Landscapes (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 295. 
42 Clark McCauley, “The Psychology of Group Identification and the Power of Ethnic Nationalism,” 
in Ethnopolitical Warfare: Causes, Consequences, and Possible Solutions, ed. D. Chirot and M. Seligman, 
(Washington, DC: American Psychological Assoc., 2001) 348.  
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historically been exclusionary of dissenting voices. Scholars agree that the nature of the 
Algerian state was deeply affected by its divergent (from that of Morocco) colonial 
experience. The brutality of French occupation and decolonization imprinted a societal 
mentality seeking a monolithic identity (one diametrically opposed to a French identity) 
after independence. While Algeria’s political system did eventually open (at least 
nominally), it has remained dominated by the National Liberation Front (FLN) party, the 
natural resource industry and the political-military complex called, le Pouvoir. Unlike in 
Morocco, the stalwart grip of executive power in Algeria derives its legitimacy from the 
backing of a strong military and a ubiquitous military intelligence service (i.e., 
Department of Intelligence and Security—the DRS).43  In both states this hypothesis falls 
in step with an instrumentalist theory on ethnic conflict—both states have been 
dominated by strong leadership personalities as well as influential elites. The extent of 
state-institutional solutions will be examined within this supposition.   
My secondary hypothesis is that the nature of the Amazigh movement in each 
state has most affected the outcomes. In Algeria, all contemporary opposition activity is 
shaped by the memory of the decade long bloodbath between the radical Islamists and a 
repressive regime. This corporate memory may have prompted overreaction from the 
security apparatus such during the “Black Spring” of 2001 when the government forces 
killed 126 rioters protesting the murder of an Amazigh teenager killed while in custody.44  
This event and consequent lingual discrimination has caused a chasmic mistrust of the 
government despite grudging concessions on language and identity. In Morocco, scholars 
argue that elite and urban influence most heavily shaped the Amazigh movement with the 
bulwark of its momentum created under the framework of international identity 
movements. 
                                                
43 Arieff, Algeria, RL21532, 3.  
44 Alexis Arieff, Algeria: Current Issues, CRS Report RS21532 (Washington, DC: Library of 
Congress, Congressional Research Service , February 10, 2011), 9-10.    
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The methodology of this thesis is a comparative study of the two largest states in 
the Maghrib, one with a large geographically spread out Amazigh population and the 
other with a smaller but generally more concentrated Amazigh population. This 
methodology presumes the state to be the largest actor in the public and private discourse 
and assumes that it acts in its own self-interest to the goal of regime preservation. In this 
thesis the dependent variable is the different Amazigh outcomes within each state. The 
independent variables then align with the two hypotheses as to the factor that most 
influenced the outcomes. Since the two states have both similarities and very important 
differences (i.e., economic, political, geographic, and historical diversions), one can 
expect degrees of variation in both the causal factors and the outcomes (as well as the 
pace of reforms leading to those outcomes).   These multiple levels of analysis and 
comparison will then yield a thick and descriptive understanding of state-Amazigh 
movement interactions in Algeria and Morocco. 
While many of the possible causal factors have been explored previously in 
segmented approaches, they have not been evaluated in this comparative manner that 
spans from colonial independence to the Arab Spring. An examination of primary source 
documents will be important to determine the level of influence for each factor. In 
addressing the nature of state institutions as the causal factor, constitutional changes, 
royal declarations and formal and informal bureaucratic practices must be examined. The 
Amazigh movement will be evaluated using news reporting, official and unofficial (i.e., 
not sanctioned by the government) charters and statements from Amazigh movements 
and political parties, as well as reports by international organizations such as the United 
Nations and Human Rights Watch.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
My second chapter will be the primary hypothesis that examines the nature of 
both states’ institutions from their colonial independence up to present day. It will trace 
the evolution of those institutions, political parties and official government policies. This 
chapter will emphasize the role of each nation’s king or president (addressing state 
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leadership in the context of instrumentalism) and is divided into three periods. The first 
section will analyze the effects of each state’s struggle for independence on the 
Imazighen as well as the Amazigh role during and immediately afterwards. The next 
section will address regime policies of Arabization as they affected the Amazigh 
populace in each state.   Finally, the chapter will address each state’s policies and 
concessions to the Amazigh activists beginning at the dawn of the 21st century.  
The third chapter will examine the nature, breadth and role of the Amazigh 
movements in the region. It is divided into three parts with the first section addressing the 
role of the Amazigh in a region’s history that carries an overwhelming Arab-Islamic bias. 
Comparing each state’s version of Amazigh history with that of the Amazigh movements 
themselves will give context to the existing tensions. Discussions of Amazigh origins still 
bring about considerable debate among scholars and politicians—this debate will be 
encapsulated here. The next section addresses the Amazigh movement at independence 
and its faltering attempts at mobilization. The last section is the focus of the chapter and 
it will address the Amazigh movement as an identity movement that has struggled to find 
its footing and role in each state beginning in the 1970s and up through the Arab Spring.  
The concluding chapter will offer a synthesis and measured assessment of the 
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II. STATE INSTITUTIONS AND AMAZIGH IDENTITY 
This chapter examines the degree to which the nature of each state’s institutions 
themselves proved influential to the outcomes for the Amazigh populations. In both 
states, this influence was wielded through restrictions on language policy and political 
parties. When evaluating Amazigh outcomes in terms of language policies—an 
examination of the nature of the each state’s institutions is an obvious tact because the 
state itself exercises near total control over such policies within its own borders. Nowhere 
is this assumption more valid than in authoritarian states where there is no legal or 
procedural mechanism by which to respond to injustice. Aside from linguistic policies, 
one must also analyze another control mechanism—the interactions between the state and 
its control and manipulation of its political party system.  
Despite protestations to the contrary (especially by Morocco’s government)45—
neither state is a democracy—both states instead should be viewed as authoritarian ones. 
As shown in the following graphic from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) 2012 
Democracy Index, Morocco and Algeria have nearly identical scores. While Morocco 
barely qualifies as a hybrid regime (for the first time since the index began), Algeria 
firmly falls in the index’s category for authoritarian regimes. With abysmal overall scores 
of 3.83 and 4.07 out of ten and worldwide ranks of 115th and 118th (for Morocco and 
Algeria respectively), both countries fall well short in categories of electoral process, 
pluralism, and political participation. Morocco’s escape from categorization as an 
authoritarian regime is more a function of its government’s marginal ability to  
 
                                                
45 Moroccans are quick to delineate between their legislature and the monarchy itself when they 
describe the nature of the regime. In a 2001 interview with Le Figaro, published September 4, 2001, 
Mohammed VI asserted that “Morocco is a democracy” as he referred to upcoming fall parliamentary 
elections. A 29 August 2009 Economist article, “Popular but Prickly, Morocco and its King,” recounted a 
2009 Tel Quel poll that found that nearly half of all Moroccans described Morocco as a democracy. Algeria 
has made similar claims as reported in the May 25, 1995 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. This report 
captured a May  23, 1995 speech on Algerian radio by Prime Minister Sifki in which he claimed that 
“Algeria is not a dictatorship; Algeria is a democracy which is building itself with its opposition parties. . .”  
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unctionand enact policy (earning them a still-low 4.64) than an ethos that espouses  
liberal political empowerment and freedom.46 Freedom House’s 2013 report affirms the 
EIU’s evaluation, calling Morocco only “partly free” and labeling Algeria as “not free.”47    
                                                
46 Economist Intelligence Unit, “2012 Democracy Index: Democracy at a Standstill,” last accessed 
May 10, 2013, http://www.eiu.com/Handlers/WhitepaperHandler.ashx?fi=Democracy-Index-
2012.pdf&mode=wp&campaignid=DemocracyIndex12. 
47Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance,” last 






Figure 2.  Democracy Index (After 2012 Economist Intelligence Unit)  
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Central to the state’s power is its ability to enact and enforce language policy. 
Language’s role has been one of constant importance in the post-independence history of 
both countries as they strove to form national identities distinct from that of their French 
colonial masters. While the totality of Arab nationalism encompassed more than the 
Arabic language—the role of classical Arabic as a method of unification and as a 
distinguisher from previous colonial masters—has been paramount.48  Both states’ 
official espousal of Arabic’s has had important intended and unintended effects on 
Amazigh outcomes throughout the last 60 years.   Throughout much of that time period 
Tamazight remained firmly ensconced in the background, an afterthought in the battle 
between French, Arabic, and at times, darija (i.e., the local North African Arabic 
dialect).49 
As authoritarian states, the bulwark of decision-making power remains vested in 
the executive branch. While elections are held for the Parliaments, their members hold 
little real decision-making power. Instead the regulations for the political party system 
remain an instrument for each state’s leader to maintain and consolidate power.   As 
mentioned in the introduction the seat of power in both nations is cemented and protected 
by elite power groups (i.e., the makhzen in Morocco and le Pouvoir in Algeria). Much of 
the king and president’s actions in both countries focus on placating these groups and 
manipulating them to consolidate personal power and wealth.     
  Algeria’s bicameral Parliament is made up of a 144-seat Council of the Nation 
and a 462-seat National People’s Assembly. The President of the state directly appoints 
one-third of the seats on the Council of the Nation, as well as the president of the 
government. The 462 seats of the People’s Assembly are elected through a closed list 
proportional representation system.50  Historically low voter turnout (oscillating between 
30% to 45%) for the past decade of parliamentary elections is indicative of the 
                                                
48 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, “ Arabization and its Discontents: The Rise of the Amazigh Movement in 
North Africa,” Journal of the Middle East and Africa 3, no. 2 (2012): 110.   
49 Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 111.   
50 Election Guide, “Algeria Election Profile,” last updated January 10, 2006, 
http://www.electionguide.org/election.php?ID=442. 
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disenfranchisement of the populace.51  The recent dissolution of presidential term limits 
serves to further amplify the true seat of power within the nation.   
Morocco also has a bicameral Parliament consisting of a 270-seat Chamber of 
Counselors and a 325-seat Chamber of Representatives. The President chooses the Prime 
Minister (i.e., the head of the government) from the party with the largest representation 
in parliament. The chamber of counselors is elected through an indirect vote (i.e., through 
local councils, professional and labor groups) and the representatives through a closed-
list proportional representation system.52  Despite elections frequently touted as “free and 
fair” by the regime, the constitution renders the parliament relatively impotent. The 
constitution grants the king the right to relieve any parliament members, to dissolve the 
parliament entirely or to call for new elections at any time. The king is also able to veto 
any legislation or to create and issue his own decrees (i.e., dahir). The Arab Spring 
induced 2011 constitutional changes that delegated some measures of the king’s power to 
the prime minister (e.g., the right to dissolve parliament) but most reports have 
characterized the concessions as half-hearted cosmetic ones focused more on the 
retention of power than true reform. While the 2011 referendum enjoyed a 98.5% turnout 
(more suggestive of voter fraud than a free and fair vote), the turnout for the 2007 and 
2011 legislative elections was only around 30%.53  This electoral malaise is the best 
reflection of the monopoly on power enjoyed by the king and his palace loyalists.   
While this authoritarian thread runs strongly through the fabric of each state’s 
history, the nature of this individual monopoly on power has not been a static one but has 
been dynamic, always changing to assure a continued power consolidation. This chapter 
demonstrates the divergent manner with which Morocco and Algeria have responded to 
dissent since independence. While not without instances of repression and violence, 
                                                
51 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter Turnout Data for Algeria,” 
last updated October 5, 2011, http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=66. 
52 Election Guide, “Morocco Country Profile,” last updated December 1, 2011, 
http://www.electionguide.org/country.php?ID=146 
53 Paul Silverstein, “Weighing Morocco’s New Constitution,” Middle East Research and Information 
Project,” July 5, 2011. http://www.merip.org/mero/mero070511; International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, “Voter Turnout Data for Morocco,” last updated October 5, 2011, 
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=138. 
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Morocco’s primary and reflexive response has been to use its institutions (or to change 
and alter them) to coopt key opposition voices or parties. In contrast, Algeria’s initial 
reaction to dissent has been the repression and exclusion of dissenting voices, the effects 
of which have rarely been softened by less severe behavior later on. In both countries, 
however, the personality and character of its president or king has firmly driven the 
state’s narrative arc. These different leaders have then either amplified or reduced the 
extent of cooptation or repression through institutional manipulation of both language 
policies, as well as, restrictions on the political party system (i.e., the creation of artificial 
barriers to party formation and mobilization).   
It is useful, therefore, to begin the assessment at Algeria and Morocco’s birth as a 
modern state. The chapter begins by addressing the relevant language policies and 
institutional political changes throughout each state’s colonial experience and their 
subsequent effects following independence. Then it compares both continued changes in 
policy during both states Arabization efforts during the 1970s and 1980s. The chapter 
continues by analyzing key events and the states’ actions at the turn of the century 
through the Arab Spring. Each section is organized around the instrumental state 
leaders—only three for Morocco—with many more for Algeria. An examination of the 
way each state formed, manipulated and wielded its institutions to affect outcomes for its 
Amazigh population is readily apparent in its laws, official decrees, constitutions and 
amendments.   
A. COLONIALISM AND THE FIGHT FOR INDEPENDENCE: 
MOHAMMED V AND AHMED BEN BELLA 
The effects of each state’s struggle for colonial independence are still evident 
today in Morocco and Algeria.   Morocco’s colonial experience came under the auspices 
of a protectorate. While a façade, the populace was given at least the semblance of self-
governance. Their independence, claimed by Mohammed V on 18 November 1956, came 
more as the result of a political struggle than a physical one (especially when compared 
to Algeria—albeit not a struggle absent violence and bloodshed—which was formed and 
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driven from the Riffian Imazighen).54  Algeria’s colonial experience on the other hand 
was complete and brutal (one without even the pretense of autonomy)—their 
independence on July 5, 1962 came as the fruit of a nearly decade-long bloody 
insurgency against the French. In both cases, the colonial experience physically unified 
previously autonomous and loosely connected territories and inculcated in its inhabitants 
the idea of a national identity. This idea would become a powerful instrument for the 
budding nationalists leading up to the struggle for independence.55  In both states, the 
focus during this period was accordingly on the state political system and institutions 
versus language policies. 
1. Morocco 
Prior to colonization by the French, the Sultanate in Morocco had limited control 
over his own territory. With the majority of Amazigh tribes living in the remote and 
spread out mountain ranges, much of the Sultan’s rule had only a token effect on the 
many of the tribes living in the mountains. This relationship was characterized by a 
tension between the bled al-makhzen and bled al-siba (i.e., the land of the ruling elite and 
the land of dissidence). The Amazigh roots in the bled al-siba served as a counterweight 
and defense against the undemocratic values of the ruling class—this explains much of 
the lasting hostility today between the Amazigh movement and the ruling Fassis 
families.56  
It took the French over two decades (from 1912 to 1934) to completely “pacify” 
the tribes living in Morocco’s three mountain ranges  (i.e., the Rif, Atlas and Anti-
Atlas).57   The French based these efforts on a mistaken understanding of the relationship 
between the Amazigh tribes and the Moroccan leadership structure. Most notably they 
assumed the entire reason for the traditional Amazigh resistance was due to their 
                                                
54 Nisan, “Minorities,” 1st ed., 59. 
55 Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 114–115.   
56 Mickael Bensadoun, “The (re) Fashioning of a Moroccan National Identity,” in Maghrib in the New 
Century: Identity, Religion, and Politics, ed. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Gainesville: University Press of 
Florida, 2007), 27. 
57 Jonathan Wyrtzen, “Colonial State-Building and the Negotiation of Arab and Berber Identity in 
Protectorate Morocco,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 43, no.2 (2011): 229.  
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eschewal of shar’ia—thus Lieutenant Colonel Henrys’ 1914 decree (that would 
eventually reappear as the infamous 1930 Berber dahir) supposed that by granting the 
Amazigh tribes judicial autonomy the French could curry favor and turn them against the 
ruling Arab class. This autonomy came at the expense of other freedoms (e.g., isolation, 
privacy, etc.) as the French government built up the infrastructure in the mountains and 
devoted considerable cartographic effort to study and classifying the country sides and 
tribal structures—all in the name of la mission civilatrice.58 
This true aim of the pacification campaign was not, of course, an elevation of the 
Imazighen but instead a harnessing of their military prowess and resources. Poems from 
the late 1920’s and early 1930’s reflect the Imazighen’s mixed feelings of being 
conquered and forced to fight their own countrymen but also of pride in being relied upon 
by the French army.59  Eventually the French taxes, labor practices and annexation of 
their tribal land would solidly mobilize both Amazigh resistance and their identification 
with the nationalist cause.60 
The rising Salafi nationalist surge recognized these efforts to “divide and 
conquer” and insisted on a unified Arab-Islamic front that drew from the nation’s 
traditional historical narrative (as written by the Arab conquerors). This insistence was 
encapsulated in one of the nationalist rally cries: “do not separate use from our brothers, 
the Berbers.”61  It also meant that the nationalists called for a ban on Tamazight and 
insisted on the use of Islam as a unifier to consolidate resistance, even as the Sultan 
signed away valuable coastal lands and the central plains to the French.62  This rhetoric 
and effort was effective in shifting the rural mindset as by the 1940’s most Imazighen 
began to demand that their children be sent to Arabic-speaking schools to ensure their 
upward mobility.63 
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Despite attempts by the French government to coopt the Imazighen during the 
colonial/protectorate period, Amazigh military leadership would prove essential to the 
nationalist battle for independence—indeed, a Riffian Amazigh was one of the leading 
fighters against the French.64  Post-independence the Moroccan Army was led by an 
Amazigh from the Rif mountains; in all Imazighen made up 90% of its service 
members.65   
Shortly after independence in 1956, the makhzen formed alliances with the many 
of the influential Amazigh military leaders, effectively hamstringing any possible 
attempts at ethnic mobilization.66  This fell squarely into the palace pattern of ruling by 
co-optation—the government exploited the rural Amazigh military prowess for the 
benefit of their Arab-centric political goals (i.e., independence, autonomy and post-
colonial power consolidation).67    
Following independence several violent rebellions erupted to protest the 
government subjugation of rural objectives and needs, however, these uprisings were 
decidedly anti-PI (versus anti-monarchy). A rebellion occurred in both 1957 and 1958 (in 
Tafilalet in the South and the Rif in the North respectively) that was quickly and brutally 
put down by the newly consolidated Moroccan Royal Army under the leadership of then 
Crown Prince Hassan II.68  Following independence, key opponents of any attempts at an 
Amazigh political voice was (and remains) the PI. PI leader Ben Barka (who would later 
leave the party to form the Union of Popular Forces [UNFP] opposition party) captured 
his party’s sentiment during a 1958 interview in which lambasted the Amazigh people as 
a creation of the French. He further charged that the Imazighen held no ethnic particular 
identity—they were instead “simply someone who hadn’t been to school.”69  Amazigh 
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activist and historian Ali Sidqi Azaykou characterized the PI efforts as tantamount to 
“cultural hegemony.”   While such charges may have some validity, they fail to address 
the leadership roles of some Amazigh within the PI and other parties.70   
On 15 November 1958 the pragmatic king granted the right for cultural 
associations to form (specifically it granted the “freedom of association”) through a dahir 
(number 1–58–376.).71   This was not a particularly Amazigh-oriented concession but 
rather a method of elite political control. During the previous two years, the PI had 
stymied attempts by activists to organize by blocking legislation that would authorize the 
freedom to associate. The king effectively trumped their efforts and allowed activists the 
ability to meet, organize and plan.72  While these groups and others were now allowed to 
meet, there were (and continue to be 50 years later) numerous stipulations and a heavy 
dose of bureaucratic oversight that borders on outright monitoring and harassment.73  In 
this respect, these the freedom to associate enable just one more method of surveillance 
that the regime used to direct and channel Amazigh activism.   
Aside from the bifurcated loyalties within the Amazigh elite, the Mouvement 
Populaire (MP) emerged in 1959 as a political party that sought—ostensibly—to 
represent the demands of the Imazighen and to act as a rural counterweight to the urban-
focused PI. In reality, their formation had little to do with representing the needs of the 
Amazigh people and much more to do with the political machinations of the king. 
Devised in part to quash PI aspirations of a single party political system, the MP was 
created at the prompting of the king to his loyal friend (and formed leader of the National 
Liberation army) Abdelkrim Khatib to join Mahjub Ahardan in leading and creating the 
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MP.74  This action was done in concert with the recruitment of Amazigh notables in key 
cabinet positions (all to the detriment and exclusion of PI members). While they would 
later promote an agenda focused on agrarian land reform (though in reality one more 
focused on land redistribution among the elite), their initial party goal was one solely 
devoted to supporting the seat of the monarchy above all other concerns.75  These 
immediate post-independence actions by the king, however, represented concerted and 
deliberate efforts to maintain and improve relations with the base centers of rural 
resistance and power as a method to insure the legitimacy and security of the monarchy.76    
As illustrated, these relationships had little to do with the recognition of ethnicity or 
language and instead were key factors in established the initial power base for the king in 
the post-independence melée.  
In 1961 Mohammed V put in their constitution’s first article that Morocco was an 
Arab and Muslim kingdom and that Arabic was the nation’s official and national 
language. In 1962 amidst tense relations with Egypt, however, Hassan II capitulated to a 
request from an Amazigh delegation and removed out the reference to the “Arab 
kingdom” as well as the reference to Arabic as a “national language”77   
2. Algeria 
Algeria’s colonial experience was characterized by much more brutality from the 
French occupying forces than was Morocco’s considerably less violent protectorate 
experience. After extinguishing three centuries of Ottoman rule (which itself came after 
nine centuries of Arab rule) beginning in 1830, France came to view the lands of Algeria 
as an extension of its own borders over the next 160 years.  
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France would declare Algeria as their own territory in 1848.78  The indigenous 
habitants, however, were never held with the same esteem by the French as the land on 
which they lived.79  The French subjugation of any relevant, particular Algerian identity 
served as a motivation and a point of origin for nationalists beginning in the 1930s. 
Salafist ulama Shaykh Abdul Hamid Bin Badis led the ulama in their creation of a triad 
Algerian identity consisting of their sovereign land, God (i.e., Allah or Islam more 
broadly) and Arab brotherhood (and importantly Arabic language). The nationalists 
transformed the components of this identity into a rallying cry that flew in the face of the 
assimilationist evolues and which left no room for dissension or particularism (i.e., other 
minority identities).80  These views would become increasingly strident and exclusive, 
nearly stamping out any notions of a specific Kabyle identity during and shortly after the 
revolution.   
Algeria’s Amazigh populace was concentrated across three largely inaccessible 
mountain ranges (i.e., maritime Kabylie in the North, the Djurdjura in the South, and the 
Agawa ranges between the two)81; they were the last holdouts against French military 
forces in the 19th century.   Their proximity to the coast, however, eventually brought 
them into more frequent contact with the occupation forces in the 20th century. For the 
Kabyle, this proximity gave them distinct advantages through access to the French 
education system. This meant that most Kabyle were speaking Tamazight and French—
not Arabic—it also meant they had more opportunities for education in France itself.82  
Kabyle access to French educational resources, however, did not translate to empathy for 
their colonial masters. The Kabyle people would be the source of some of the 
revolution’s fiercest freedom fighters and the heart of the anti-French efforts. 
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The Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) offered the framework for the Algerian 
battle for independence. Led by nine key leaders–les neufs historique—they all eschewed 
the assimilationist mentality and asserted that only independence would suffice. While 
these men were all secular Francophones, their time spent as conscripts in the French 
army (and in French prisons) solidified their desire for independence in the form of a 
secular republic.83  The FLN leadership strove to present a uniform non-sectarian 
message (partially as a response to anti-Kabyle rhetoric from within le Parti du Peuple 
Algrien [PPA] ranks). Their priority throughout the revolution remained unity above all 
else—to that end they killed more Algerian civilians than French ones (i.e., 16,000 
Algerians versus only 2,700 French).84  In reality, much of the revolution was distinctly 
Kabyle and spearheaded by guerilla fighters from bases in that region. Their military 
prowess served to inspire the rest of Algeria to come together and fight against France.85  
While these Amazigh warriors made significant strides against the French in the 
countryside, their influence in the FLN waned as the urban fronts (an overwhelmingly 
Arab demographic) consolidated their efforts and dominated the ideology. This meant 
that despite the Kabyles’ military successes, an emerging Arab political identity would 
dominate the post-war Algerian landscape.   
Nowhere was this incongruence more readily apparent than in the fates of several 
of the FLN’s Kabyle leaders throughout the fight for Algerian independence. Kabyle 
revolutionary Abane Ramdane espoused a demilitarized and secular post-colonial Algeria 
and was killed by FLN political rivals in 1958. The government arrested and sentenced 
Hocine Ait Ahmed to death in 1964 for his guerilla war demanding political pluralism (he 
would escape two years later); President Boumedienne ordered the brutal strangling of 
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Ahmed Ben Bella ally Belkacem Krim in his hotel room in 1970.86   While their deaths 
and others in the revolution’s leadership were not all outcomes of a direct government 
effort to politically quiet a Kabyle Amazigh post-war identity (i.e., they were killed for 
their position and aspirations to power rather than an ethnic identity), they do reveal a 
deliberate choice by the newly formed government to cling to the newly independent 
Arab Algerian identity, as well as an inability for Kabyles to assert their role (or their 
ethnic and linguistic concerns) following independence. By and large they were the 
political and national losers in the power vacuum left by the retreating French.   
The manner in which the Algerian state dealt with these opposition voices is 
emblematic of a wider and prototypical historical response. That is not to say that its only 
response has ever been solely repression, assassination and death—while Ait Ahmed’s 
effort did result in his jailing—the government did also bring more Kabyles into the 
government afterwards in an attempt to quell further rebellion.87  While the short-term 
possibility of recognition or rights for the Kabyle Amazigh was quashed at 
independence—the substantial émigré population in Paris kept the movement alive—this 
intellectual diaspora would prove crucial in the last quarter of the century.88 
The central political voice for the Amazigh populace over the next 30 years 
(although tolerated only quasi-officially)—the FFS—emerged as a product of Ait 
Ahmed’s evaluation of a parliamentary seat as a distraction to Ben Bella’s rapidly 
growing consolidation of power.89  Organizing a grass-roots guerilla resistance in Kabyle 
he pushed the populace there to abstain from voting for the upcoming referendum and 
presidential elections with a broad measure of localized success. On 29 September 1963, 
Ait Ahmed formed the FFS as a counterforce to what he deemed a “fascist 
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dictatorship.”90  The potency of his resistance efforts, however, was thwarted by the 
frontier border war with Morocco. Ben Bella was effective in painting Ait Ahmed as 
unpatriotic and anyone standing against the regime as a possible collaborator with 
Morocco. In the patriotic rush of fighters to the border to battle against Morocco, the FFS 
lost its momentum; the widespread arrests of thousands of political dissidents (Ait 
Ahmed and his lieutenants among them) and staging of troops in Kabyle in 1964 
effectively quashed any hopes for the movement in its foreseeable future.91 
For all the nationalist rhetoric decrying France’s assimilationist efforts, it was not 
without irony that Ben Bella’s 1962 national independence address proclaiming the re-
inculcation of an Arab identity and language was delivered in French: “Notre langue 
nationale, l’arab, va retrouver sa place.”92  The inability of the President (a vocal admirer 
of President Nassser) and his cabinet to converse in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) 
would become the object of ridicule in many foreign Arab papers as they carried out 
official visits following independence.93  A few months later, Ben Bella and the National 
Assembly moved to put an Arabic language policy into place—decreeing that Arabic 
would be taught at the elementary schools and that it would be systematically promoted 
with government’s administration.94  He did acknowledge, however, that French would 
continue to be taught due to its prevalence in the study of science and technology.95  
Tamazight suffered almost immediately at the university level with the removal of the 
Amazigh studies chair at the University of Algiers occurring in concert with Algerian 
independence.96 
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The 1964 Charter of Algiers trumpeted Arab-Algerian identity and was a near 
complete copy of the FLN’s 1954 platform.97  One of the charter’s resolutions  “[insisted] 
on the urgency of emphasizing Arabization in Algeria by: a) acceleration in the teaching 
of Arabic; b) reinforcement of ties, in particular cultural ties, with the Arab world. . . .; c) 
increase in the sphere of studies in Arabic at the university level.”98  Despite the overt 
exclusion of Tamazight from the charter as well as other related regime language 
policies, there was little initial pushback because the slow process of Arabization meant 
that most Imazighen could still conduct their affairs in French. Ben Bella was also quick 
to include five Amazigh men in his initial cabinet as an effort to placate activists.99 
A major obstacle to Arabization efforts within the education system was the 
dearth of qualified Algerian citizens to teach Arabic.   The regime’s solution was to 
import 1000 “teachers” from Egypt, later supplementing them with more educators of 
questionable background and training from Syria and Iraq. This was a process that would 
continue into the 1970s. Unfortunately there were no standards or mechanisms to assess 
or ensure that these primary and secondary school teachers were in fact proficient in 
Arabic or that they were in fact educators. The outcome of this poorly managed plan was 
that most of these imported men and women were subpar and unable to properly teach 
classic Arabic. Further complicating their efforts were the wide-ranging dialectical 
differences between the various countries that further complicated matters.100  Aside 
from the linguistic challenges, many of the Egyptian teachers were also Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) members who were active in their attempts to impart their more rigid 
embodiment of Islam into a largely uneducated and receptive populace.101  At least 
partial effects of this indoctrination can be seen in the rise of violent extremism decades 
later (this connection does not mean to equate the MB with violence).   
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B. MAGHRIB ARABIZATION: HASSAN II (1961–1999) AND 
BOUMEDIENE, BITAT AND CHADI BENDJEDID (1965–1992) 
In addressing Maghrib Arabization, the term maghrib itself is indicative of an 
Arab orientation—the Maghrib countries standing at the western reaches of a line of 
origin that began in the Arab mashreq (i.e., the East). From a macro-historical 
perspective, of course, Arabization in the Maghrib is not a modern phenomenon—
Arabization has been a process that began in concert with the first waves of seventh 
century Arab invaders and continued organically through the centuries. The formal state 
institutionalization of taaroub  (i.e., the process of becoming Arab), however, was a 
decidedly contemporary creation whose implementation required that both Algeria and 
Morocco become “modern states.”102  For most Imazighen, the formalization and state 
imposition of an Arab identity was not in and of itself a threatening prospect—nearly 
every citizen (Imazighen included) in both states would primarily self-identify as an Arab 
to some degree. The threat came from the imposition of Arabic as the sole universal and 
accepted norm for all communication within the state. 
As addressed in previous section, the impetus behind Arabization came from each 
state’s French colonial experience where access and upward mobility was solely limited 
to Francophone inhabitants. Both states saw Arabization as the pivotal element by which 
to right these institutionalized wrongs and legislate a return to their true Arab roots (in 
Algeria, for instance, Arabic was legally categorized as a foreign language from 1938 to 
1961).103  For the millions of Tamazight speakers whose Amazigh “roots” predated their 
Arab ones, this policy would be an affront to their very identity. Decreeing a de facto—
and increasingly a de jure—mandate that all citizens could only be Arab in their ethnic 
identity and Arabic in their speech superseded what the stated view as assimilation but 
was tantamount to a spiritual ethnic cleansing for the Imazighen themselves.  
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1. Morocco 
Following independence, Morocco’s Arabization efforts had their greatest effects 
within the nation’s education system. Within this system, the country’s youths were 
taught a narrative that echoed a broader Arab-Islamic one. Its essence asserted that 
Morocco’s history only began when the Arab liberators arrived to free the Imazighen 
from their backward lives and instilled them with a respect and knowledge of Islam. It 
further stipulated that Amazigh origins lay in Yemen and that Tamazight was a derivative 
language of Arabic.104  Morocco’s official historian wrote and predicted that Arabization 
and a national transportation system would drive out Tamazight within 50 years—leaving 
only MSA and colloquial Arabic.105  These sentiments were further amplified by UNFP 
leader Mohammed Abd al-Jabri who denigrated both darija and Tamazight as inferior 
and incapable of either mobilization or the achievement of broad societal change. Al-
Jabri further advocated that Tamazight, in particular, should be stricken from all media as 
well as the education system.106 
Despite his marriage to an Amazigh woman named Latifa, Hassan II had been 
merciless as the Crowned Prince in his military response to the rebellions of the Riffian 
Amazigh after independence.107  This violence left an indelible mark that would not be 
officially assuaged until a visit by Hassan II’s son, Mohammed VI, nearly half a century 
later.   Unofficially, however, the king would strengthen his relationships with key 
Amazigh tribes by continuing the traditional monarchic practice of arranging marriages 
for them with the daughters of key Moroccan families.108   His ascension as king, 
however, did allow him to rule in a more active manner than his father (a more passive 
arbitrator). In particular, this meant that Hassan II was better able to manage and 
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manipulate the PI whom he viewed as a serious threat to the monarchy’s power.109  A 
key instrument in lessening the PI threat was his alliance with the Amazigh military 
power and an easily controlled pro-monarchist MP. 
Despite these attempts to consolidate power, the 1970s proved a turbulent era 
with numerous struggles for power among the historical and military elite. In July 1971, a 
group primarily made up Imazighen dissatisfied with the continuing influence, power and 
corruption of controlling Fassi families (not the king himself) hatched an attempted coup 
that failed. A year later military officers made an attempt to destroy a plane on which the 
king was embarked. Then, in 1973 an army revolt sprang up in the Middle Atlas. The 
common thread in the staying ability of Hassan II was his ability to maintain power 
through the manipulation, control and co-optation of Amazigh officers that remained 
loyal to him.110 
In 1984, the MP was still led by its founder, Mahjoubi Aherdane. Officially, the 
party still claimed to represent rural Moroccans—most of who were Imazighen.111 The 
chaos and instability of its Algerian neighbor had a profound impact on Hassan II during 
the 1990s. It forced him to focus on maintaining stability as well as preparing the political 
and economic landscape for his son to succeed him. While the burgeoning voice of the 
Amazigh movement proved an important influence during this time period, the 
movement’s salience was dampened at times by the palace’s continued machinations in 
consolidating its domestic and regional power (i.e., its manipulation of opposition 
voices).112   
In 1991, Aherdane left the MP to start a new opposition party: the Mouvement 
Nationale Populaire (MNP). The creation of the Arab Maghrib Union a year later marked 
an important step for the kingdom in its struggle for regional hegemony. It also meant 
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that Hassan II needed to reassert the Arab character of Morocco—he did this by 
reinserting the reference to the country as an Arab states after an absence of 30 years.113   
Hassan II’s 1994 Throne Day speech came only after a public outcry erupted over 
the arrest and beating of Amazigh activists by the security forces of his ruthless Minister 
of Interior Driss Basri.114  After releasing the activists, he declared in his speech that 
“there is not one of us who cannot be sure that there is in his dynasty, blood or body a 
small or large amount of cells which came from an origin which speaks one of Morocco’s 
dialects.”115  He expounded upon this idea by asserting a tri-partite Moroccan identity as 
one that contains Arab, Amazigh and Sahrawi parts.116  He also made vague promises 
that Tamazight would be taught in schools. Here again one sees a common pattern of 
state reaction only amidst threats of public instability. As always, the state creates only 
the amount or level of concessions required to quell the public anger. In 1996, the king 
distanced himself from this three-part identity with a dahir that forbid the use of Amazigh 
names on birth certificates.117 
It worthwhile to note that there is substantial scientific evidence to support the 
assertion that most Moroccans have much more than a few genetic Amazigh cells—a 
very few Arab ones. A scientific study in 2000 examined the genetic markers of 
Moroccans and compared them to other nearby regions in Europe and the Middle East. 
Their analysis revealed that the genetic makeup of the majority of Moroccans is Amazigh 
with little relation to or influence from their seventh century Arab invaders. This fact held 
true whether examining a Tamazight speaker or an Arabic speaker. Their closest genetic 
family members are Spaniards, Basques, French, Italians, and Algerians (with Algerians 
being the closest members). The Algerian and Moroccans today are as distant from 
Middle Eastern Arabs as they are from Greeks and other Eastern Mediterranean 
groups.118 
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2. Algeria 
The bulk of the Arabization efforts in Algeria should be viewed as broad efforts at 
cultural homogenization to counter the colonial French version of history (rather than a 
targeted vendetta to denigrate Amazigh ethnic and linguistic particularity) that had grown 
in concert with its divide and rule methodology. This mindset is captured well by the 
FLN’s adoption of the mantra: “Islam is my religion, Arabic is my language, Algeria is 
my home” (originally coined in the 1930s by the pre-independence Association of Ulama 
under the leadership of Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis).119  Of course, President Boumediene’s 
conception of Islam would be one morphed to align with his greater vision of 
revolutionary socialism. He described Islam as a “revolutionary religion, [one that] has 
come to liberate man and woman.”120   
It must be noted that in its zeal to cleanse the nation of its French defilement, the 
government’s Arabization policy promoted the classical form of Arabic (as captured in 
the Qur’an), which few Algerians used in their everyday discourse.121  The Arabization 
policy that would continue over the following decades would prompt linguistic scholar 
Pauline Djité to argue that, “Nowhere else in Africa has the language issue been so 
central in the fight against colonialism (as in Algeria).”122  Indeed it was the marriage of 
MSA to the violent Islamists’ agenda that would perpetrate such a strong stance in 
Algeria. In this respect, language policy became an instrument of elite (whether religious 
or otherwise) control and authority.123 
These gradual efforts accelerated after the 1965 revolution in which Boumediene 
overthrew Ben Bella.   As the new president (whose education at the Islamic University  
of El Azhar, Egypt outweighed his own Amazigh ethnicity) would declare: “Arabization 
is not only a national and revolutionary necessity, it is also a goal that the Revolution 
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must meet, whatever its cost.”124  During this time the FLN predicted that their 
Arabization efforts would be completed by the mid-1980s. The lion’s share of that effort 
was taken up by the French-educated Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, the minister of education, 
who oversaw the Arabization of the nation’s schools.125  Even he, however, expressed 
doubts as to the likelihood of success for the state’s efforts saying, “Cela ne marchera 
pas, mais il faut le faire” (i.e., it won’t work, but we must make the effort).126  These 
efforts did, however, see fast success (i.e., almost total Arabization) at the elementary and 
secondary school level—but the universities remained a greater challenge. This upper 
level recalcitrance was combated with a national requirement that all professors learn 
Arabic, as well as through the 1974 creation of La Société Nationale d’Edition et de 
Diffusion d’Algérie (SNED)—a national publishing house devoted to promoting Arabic 
at the college level and beyond. A few months later, the President would make a speech 
on the merits of Arabization as a key element in breaking the psychic bondage of the 
French language: 
Arabization, which is an integral part of the preoccupations of this nation 
and which is guarantor of its national unity, is a strategic option of our 
socialist revolution . . . We have struggled bitterly, in order to conserve 
our national personality . . . and in order to safeguard its glory and dignity 
. . . it is absolutely unjustifiable that we speak and think in a foreign 
language . . . We have a glorious history. We belong to a secular 
civilization. It is impossible for us to separate ourselves from it.127 
Throughout the 1970s, Boumediene banned all Tamazight literature and not only 
eradicated Amazigh specific courses from the national education system but also created 
Islamic institutions in areas with concentrated Amazigh populations.128  In 1973, the 
government forced the firing of the Professor of Berber Studies at the University of 
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Algiers, Mouloud Mammeri and abolished the department itself. Seven years later their 
cancelation of his conference on Tamazight poetry would set off the “Berber Spring.”129 
In July 1976, the government published a decree outlining many new policies to 
include the requirement to change all public notices, street names and town names to 
Arabic, as well as an instruction for all citizens to turn in their licenses and license plates 
for Arabic ones. Parents were also forbidden from choosing Tamazight names for their 
children.130   The 1976 Constitution provided a foundation for such policies as it echoed 
the same calls for a uniform national identity that the FLN had been pushing since before 
independence.131  Ultimately, Boumediene’s Arabization efforts (and his own literary 
MSA fluency) would be roundly applauded following his 1978 official tour throughout 
the Middle East, leaving large shoes for his successor, Chadi Benjedid to fill the 
following year.132   In December 1979, he decided to rapidly increase the institution of 
Arabic throughout the education system (i.e., from primary school to the university-
level)—a move that would provide much of the tinder for the incendiary “Berber Spring” 
in 1980.133 
During the entire period of Arabization, the government only recognized the 
existence of an Amazigh identity once—in the preamble of 1986 National Charter.134  
This blatant disregard came despite his inclusion of five Imazighen on his Revolutionary 
Council as well as large government expenditures into economic and educational 
programs of the Aurès and Kabylie regions.135  Other systemic political policies started 
to open up toward the end of the decade. On July 21, 1987 (29 years after Morocco) law 
87–15 allowed local non-political associations to form without government 
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permission.136  This ability for cultural associations to form came nearly three decades 
after Morocco granted a similar freedom and is emblematic of the overall Algerian 
government view toward minority groups.137  While these groups are grudgingly allowed 
to exist, they remain closely monitored apolitical organizations.   
 While Ait Ahmed’s long defunct FFS became a legal political party when 
Benjedid’s government opened the political system in 1989, its opposition stance did 
little to gather support outside the Kabyle region—their efforts were no doubt hampered 
by three disparate political and cultural efforts (i.e., the FFS, RCD and MCB).138  The 
Algerian civil war erupted after the government quashed certain Islamist victory at the 
polls by canceling the final round of elections. This autocratic response, coupled with 
severe unemployment (only four million people employed in a state of twenty-five 
million at the time) radicalized elements within the Islamist party in a vehemently violent 
response that would not end for nearly a decade.139 
The two primary mobilizing groups during this widening of the political system 
were the various Amazigh associations and the Islamists. Of the two, the latter had 
superior and broader organization, as well as political heft.140  This opening only came 
after widespread demonstrations driven not by ethnic grievances but by rampant poverty, 
unemployment and economic disparity.141  The government was forced to Islamize their 
own policies more heavily toward Arabization during this period in an attempt 
emasculate the warring Islamists and weaken their religious anti-regime rhetoric. This 
was partially accomplished through the 1989 constitutional revision that once again 
trumpeted Arabic as the nation’s only official language. One concession came through 
the 4 December 1990 Law 90–31 that enabled non-political associations to operate at the 
national level. On December, 27, 1990, however, Law 91–05 laid out an 18-month 
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deadline, calling for the Arabization of all schools and government administrative offices 
in that time period. It further delineated a requirement for all university and postgraduate 
systems to make the same transition by the year 2000. In 1996, this law would be 
modified to truncate the year 2000 requirement to 1998.142 A year later the parliament 
mandated that the education system be fully Arabized within the next two years and the 
universities within the next seven.  
A January 1991 law required that “all educational and administrative 
establishments, organizations and associations must use only Arabic in all their 
commercial, financial, technical and artistic dealings” within two years. It further 
stipulated that only Arabic could be used within the judicial and education and 
transportation (i.e., highways and signs) system. It also banned the import of any 
typewriter, computer or piece of office equipment not outfitted with the Arabic alphabet. 
Finally, it declared any document not in Arabic as invalid.143 This was met with 
widespread protests in Kabyle. 
The 1990s witnessed a civic fight against the state (i.e., a struggle for social and 
economic issues) take on an ethnic framework because of the effectiveness of using 
linguistic reform (or progress/modernization) as a mobilizer in Kabyle. This approach 
proved effective to some extent, however, it was stunted by the regime’s ability to frame 
and denigrate their demands as ethnic ones—an action which only served to motivate and 
fuel Amazigh radicals (e.g., the MAK).   These actions further provoked others, such as 
Salim Chaker, to realize a need (that previously did not exist) for a specific Amazigh 
identity apart from an Algerian one, as well as autonomy on some level.    
In the fall of 1994, 700,000 students went on strike for six months throughout the 
Kabyle region. This effort, combined with two other strikes pressured the government 
into a capitulation of sorts through the creation of the High Commission on Amazighness 
(HCA).144  The official mandate of the HCA was to “[rehabilitate] Tamazight [culture] . . 
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. one of the foundations of the national identity, and the introduction of the Tamazight 
language in the systems of education and communication.”145  With the diction itself 
desultory (i.e., the idea that Amazigh culture needed rehabilitation), the execution 
followed along the same path—producing no lasting results—only a half-hearted, 
underfunded attempt at teaching Tamazight to primary school students in a few scattered 
districts.146 
Any Amazigh efforts took a secondary role, however, to the bloody violence that 
continued to escalate following Benjedid’s abolishment of the second round elections for 
fear of dominance (a certainty at that point) by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).147  
While much of FIS’ ire was directed at Francophone and western influence, it did extend 
to predominantly secular-focused Amazigh activists. Most notably, this was seen in their 
June 1998 assassination of rebel Amazigh singer-poet and nationalist Lounes Matoub. In 
this case it was not the state that directly killed or suppressed Amazigh demands, but their 
limited capacity to preserve the public order allowed the assassination to occur.  
In November 1996, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment recognizing 
Amazigh identity in Algeria but stopped short of recognizing their language.148   This 
was done as part of President Zeroual’s strategy to back his rhetoric leading into the 1997 
elections. In his speeches he called for the nation to discard notions of particularism (i.e., 
Islamic, Arab, or Amazigh identities) for the greater good of the Algerian nation. Despite 
this public pronouncement, his government would continue to push for full Arabization 
in keeping with the 5 July 1998 deadline.149  A 1996 law that mandated that government 
and civil institution affairs (as well as commercial contracts) be conducted in Arabic only 
was indicative of Zeroual’s true motives.150  
                                                
145 Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 121.   
146 Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 121.   
147 Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 159.   
148 Maddy-Weitzman, “Contested Identities,” 40. 
149 Abu-Haidar, “Arabisation in Algeria,” 160.   
150 Maddy-Weitzman, “Arabization,” 121.   
 45 
C. MOHAMMED VI (1999-PRESENT) AND ABDELAZIZ BOUTEFLIKA 
(1999-PRESENT) 
1. Morocco 
When Mohammed VI took the throne after his father’s passing, he was proactive 
in mending historical injuries, visiting the Rif region early on. This gesture was 
appreciated and he was welcomed with open arms from the inhabitants there. Following 
this visit he also invited back exiled Amazigh leader Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi from 
Cairo.151   These moves served to infuriate the nation’s Islamists but this was likely a 
deliberate calculation by Mohammed VI to manipulate both groups. The 1999 Morocco 
Educational Charter marked an important step in the Amazigh-state relationship.152  
Much as his father was influenced by episodes of public unrest in Algeria, the 
May 2001 Kabyle protests certainly influenced his dahir that year. His dahir sought 
primarily to institute the teaching of Tamazight in the classrooms—in most Maghrib 
states this type of minority language recognition is an uncommon occurrence. Much 
debate has centered on the dahir but it is certainly had a marked impact on the Amazigh 
movement. The Amazigh naysayers viewed the proclamation as an empty promise and an 
attempt to coopt their movement while its supporters viewed it as a long-awaited shift 
toward government recognition. Despite their differences in viewpoints, the dahir has 
raised the public profile of Tamazight and acted as a tool for both state and sub-state 
actors. The political and economic largesse of the Moroccan state (i.e., the makhzen) has 
the ability to affect and influence any movement within its borders.153  Finally, many 
were concerned that the king’s educational concessions could end up as a de facto 
“separate and unequal” policy that would serve to further deprive rural Amazigh of any 
chance for upward mobility by teaching them a language that is useless and unusable 
within the public and administrative job sector.154 
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On 17 October 2001, Mohammed VI officially established the IRCAM and 
endowed it with a $100 million annual budget. This state action created a split within the 
Amazigh movement with some viewing it as a pivotal step forward and others seeing it as 
just another in a series of attempts by the monarchy to co-opt opposition voices. The 
Amazigh opposition voices saw a state-sponsored entity as giving the makhzen too much 
freedom and relegating a dynamic cultural movement into a static institutionalized one 
much akin to that of folklore. They further charged that it focused the movement on 
education and linguistic standardization instead of the larger political reforms needed.155  
The movement’s split eventually radicalized some of these dissenting voices within the 
movements, pushing them to extreme political positions (for an Arab-Islamic country) 
such as supporting the U. S. invasion of Iraq (viewing it as a strike against Arab-Islamic 
repression) and even supporting Israel.156  These extremists would mock ICRAM, 
likening it to its near homophone word in the tashelhit dialect for filth, ircan.157  
The following year the king made another move indicative of a liberalizing 
political system when he amended his grandfather’s 1958 dahir by delineating that only a 
court could dissolve a cultural association. The change also created a 60-day deadline for 
the provincial government to acknowledge the formation of an association or changes to 
its membership or statutes (i.e., Law 75–00).158  Failure to provide a provisional receipt 
was deemed as an acceptable permit to continue operations. Practically, though, this 
dahir has little effect throughout the state. Local authorities continue to ignore submitted 
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paperwork, thereby preventing select groups from opening an applicable bank accounts 
and stymieing attempts to rent office and convention space.159 
In 2004, the government finally initiated Tamazight language education within 
some rural schools— the policy output of his 2001 dahir but a move still viewed by many 
as action that would further entrench an already deprived and disconnected rural lower 
class in poverty and widen the urban-rural gap.160   
With the flames of the Arab Spring ablaze throughout the region, the king made a 
speech on 9 March 2011 recognizing Tamazight as an official national language and 
Amazigh as part of the Moroccan identity. This recognition of Tamazight, however, was 
still enacted in deference to Arabic. Furthermore, the constitution’s reference to 
Tamazight as an official language of the state, still failed to raise it on par with Arabic (it 
also does not break out the different Tamazight dialects). More importantly the 
constitutional changes fail to expound on, or offer guidance on the implications and 
implementation of Tamazight as an official language.   These practical implications 
include whether or not all government institutions (to include its foreign embassies) will 
be required to be bilingual (i.e., Arabic and Tamazight) and the delineation of a clear 
timeline for lingual implementation.161 
2. Algeria 
When Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in 1999, he indicated that 21st century 
Algeria would pursue a new multicultural and multilingual direction, declaring Algeria’s 
background to be an Islamic, Arab, and Amazigh one.162  A few months later, the armed 
branch of the FIS announced a cessation of its near decade-long violent campaign against 
the regime—Bouteflika reciprocated by granting amnesty to the surrendering forces. 
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Over the last decade, the Algerian government has not employed any blatant social 
or economic discrimination specifically at any of its citizens for their Amazigh ethnicity. 
Thus, the mobilizing force is rarely an ethnic one or a common identity but rather an 
antipathy for the regime itself.163   This societal animosity (especially prevalent in Kabylie) 
grew from the ruling elites chasmic disregard for the plight and needs of its citizens. The 
term “la hogra” became popular as way to describe the alienation and humiliation caused 
by government negligence.164  The word “hogra” itself has no direct translation but the 
slang word continues to be salient today—used by both specific groups (to express their 
frustration at exclusion from the decision-making processes) and by the general populace 
(to describe the static downtrodden malaise in which the average Algerian exists).165  
In the spring of 2001, this societal estrangement produced the “Black Spring” 
(Tafsut Taberkant)—a period of discontent and protest that lasted well into the summer 
and spread outside of Kabyle. This prolonged airing of grievances brought a violent 
overreaction from the government security forces who employed torture, brutality and 
summary executions that totaled in excess of 100 deaths.166  The government would later 
attempt to atone for its violence with an 8 May 2002 Algeria constitutional amendment 
recognizing Tamazight as a “national” language but not an official one. This half-hearted 
compromise fell in line with the President’s continued resolve as to the Arab nature of the 
state, expounding on this sentiment in a 2005 speech: “Arabic will remain the only 
official language in Algeria.”167  His speech continued by mocking Amazigh aspirations 
for Tamazight equality, claiming that no other country in the world has two official 
languages.168  This statement ignored, of course, the laws and governments of 
Switzerland, Canada and Belgium (all which have multiple recognized official 
languages). 
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The continued inefficacy of the FFS in representing Amazigh demands (the same 
can said for the Ligue Algérienne pour la Defense de Droits de L’Homme (LADDH)) 
prompted the formation of the aarouch movement (later morphing into the Citizen’s 
Movement).169  The state’s ability to neutralize the political party system as a method for 
mobilization and representation proved effective as they then had only to outlast the 
poorly organized aarouch movement (this occurred in 2007). With its demise, the 
government has since been able to make only minor concessions in Kabyle at the expense 
and exclusion of the rest of the country’s Tamazight-speaking areas. By effectively 
isolating the “Amazigh question” to one region they weaken the movement’s appeal and 
also contain its mobilization efforts.170 
The government’s focus continues to ignore any acknowledgement of ethnicity 
apart from an Arab one and instead responds only to specific actors (i.e., elite and 
external states) and beliefs (i.e., Socialism, secularism and Islamism).171   This has 
shielded any momentum from the region’s Arab Spring from producing a tangible 
outcome for Algeria’s Imazighen. A corporate weariness from the decade-long civil war 
continues to dampen the prospect for any effective mass mobilization or protests. The 
protests that did occur in Algiers calling for political change were led by the nationally-
focused but largely powerless RCD.172  Despite the failure of the movement to 
effectively mobilize, the gap between the regime and its Kabyle citizens, in particular, 
continues to widen. Animosity between the aggressive and intrusive state security 
apparatus and the Kabyle political parties is approaching a boiling point if the regime 
does not change. Kabyle citizens point to a pattern of targeted government neglect 
witnessed during the harsh 2012 blizzards. Cut off from the country’s transportation 
network and social services for weeks, the populace there was left to fend for itself.173   
Faced with looming local challenges such as basic economic subsistence and a lack of 
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social services, the Kabyle parties are unlikely to effectively mobilize their populace for 
calls of linguistic and ethnic parity at the national level. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Globalization and the ubiquity of mobile smart phones has limited the ways in 
which even an authoritarian state can respond to its minority ethnic groups, irrespective 
of their mobilization tactics. Many methods, however, while not violent can still have 
devastating effects on population groups—whether concrete or psychic. These included 
exclusion from the political process, as well as more systemic exclusion from basic 
services by refusing to recognize a language spoken by millions. 
In each nation, the seat of the president and king represented the ultimate 
institutional power. As near omnipotent executors of public policy, these men were 
products of their times and chose the manner and priority by which the state would 
respond to Amazigh aspirations. The regimes of both Mohammed V and Ben Bella 
reflected a fervent nationalism that had to be bridled and guided once independence was 
won. This process placed a priority on demonstrating and consolidated the reach and 
power of nation’s leadership and relegated minority identities to an afterthought   This 
nationalism was later replaced by building decades of Arabization under Morocco’s 
Hassan II and a trio of presidents in Algeria. During Arabization, the leaders 
systematically and gradually constructed institutional barriers to the Amazigh and 
Tamazight particularity. These barriers (i.e., language policies) carried both intended and 
unintended consequences for the Imazighen. The largest challenges facing Mohammed 
VI and Bouteflika at the turn of the century was the changing nature of the global and 
national political order. Politics (and associated conflict) were no longer local, or even 
national. An increasingly mobilized and vocal Amazigh movement forced both states to 
address its concerns. These concerns, however, were taken in turn with respect to the 
rising superior power and mobility of the Islamists political forces.  
Throughout each of these key periods, however, Morocco and Algeria reacted 
uniquely to Amazigh grievances. Concessions came only as a means to retain and/or 
consolidate power. Morocco proved more effective in tempering the salience and 
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militancy of the movement through consistent cooptation. Whereas Algeria, by contrast, 
favored repression and exclusion over the recognition of a unique Amazigh identity 
within its borders. By and large, Algeria’s economic largesse (and accompanying 
freedom from aid and assistance) enable it to better slough off the concerns of the 
international community after their trademark overzealous response to protests. Morocco, 
on the other hand, was forced to be far more deliberate in its response—carefully (and 
vocally) framing cooptation under the guise of benevolent concessions.   
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III. NATURE OF THE AMAZIGH MOVEMENTS 
This chapter addresses the nature and path of Amazigh movements themselves as 
a contributing influence to the outcomes achieved. It is divided into three parts—the 
historical Amazigh, the independence Amazigh, and the modern Amazigh (i.e., the 
Amazigh within the context of identity politics and globalization). In analyzing the arc of 
the movements in both countries, it is readily apparent that the movements are secondary 
and minor actors—the state institutions are undoubtedly the greatest influencers. 
Movements exist very much under the shadow of the authoritarian state—forced to walk 
a common and fine line–between pro5test and subservience to established normative 
opposition behavior.   The movements in the two states, however, took very different 
paths shaped by the state behavior. The co-optive behavior of Morocco’s regime funneled 
its Amazigh movement toward a milder path. Algeria’s default repressive response, by 
contrast, channeled its opposition Amazigh constituents toward much more radical 
behavior.  
While many leaders and Arab scholars within the Moroccan and Algerian state 
have argued that the Amazigh identity and self-awareness is an artificial and modern 
creation, most in the Amazigh movements argue for a primordial identity birthed 
thousands of years ago as original inhabitants of North Africa.174  The role and function 
of this historical Amazigh within both states’ history is then a relatively new 
acknowledgement but one whose study is fundamental to the legitimacy of the movement 
today.   The independence Amazigh was a more a victim of the race to fill the power 
vacuum left by France’s retreat/exit than deliberate targeted subjugation aimed at their 
movement or ethnicity. That said, the post-independence struggle in Algeria was much 
more sanguine and contested. The modern Amazigh is divided into two main periods—
the movement that emerged with the rise of identity politics in the 1970s and its ensuing 
maturation at the close and dawn of the new century. In Morocco, this movement 
bloomed in the context of multiculturalism and a heightened societal recognition. A 
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darker undercurrent ran through the movement’s narrative in Algeria during the violence 
and bloodshed surrounded the highly publicized Berber Spring and its later derivations. 
Finally, the idea of a pan-Amazigh movement must be addressed despite its lack of 
serious traction at this point. With the instantaneous flow of news and communication 
enabled through the ubiquitous presence of mobile smartphones, some iteration of the 
global Amazigh is sure to evolve. 
For the movements in both states, the notion that the geographic location and 
concentration of their constituents (i.e., its Amazigh inhabitants) could further explain 
each movement’s potency or weakness at different points in history appears to be an 
easily verified relationship. One could then use this relationship to explore voting 
behavior and the degree of correlation with economic data. This relationship could also 
pinpoint specific government repression or exclusion. In most developed liberal 
democracies this would be true. The ability to conduct such analysis, of course, hinges on 
population and demographic data (i.e., census data) being available, comprehensive and 
reliable.   
In Morocco’s case their last census was in 2003–4 and on it there was no option 
for the citizen to state that they speak Tamazight as a primary, secondary or tertiary 
language. There was also no option to designate one’s ethnicity (this is the standard for 
nearly all Arab-Islamic countries, to include Algeria). Instead a researcher attempting to 
correlate ethnic or language data with patterns of voting behavior is left to imprecise 
guesswork and unverifiable assessments.175  Even the oft-touted percentages of 
Tamazight speakers (whether by international organizations or the states themselves) are 
largely guesswork). The states are able to use the census as also a political tool to limit 
the salience or potency of self-identified Imazighen (or more specifically Tamazight 
speakers) within the political system.176  If Amazigh groups had this data, they could 
then make a more powerful argument for grievances of economic repression, exclusion or 
inequality. The flip-side to this point, though, is (as Benedict Anderson points out in 
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Chapter Ten of Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism) that states can also use census data to create an artificial classification 
within their population. They can then us it to systematically target and exclude or expel 
(either by force or by “choice”) specific groups within their borders (e.g., the notorious 
Bhutan census that resulted in the expulsion of more than 100,000 citizen of Nepalese 
ethnicity).177 
 
Figure 3.  Major Tamazight Dialects (After Lauermann, 2009) 
In Morocco there are three overall geographic Amazigh groups (i.e., the Beraber 
Tamazight-speakers [in the Middle and High Atlas mountains], the Chleuh Tachelhit-
speakers [in the Southwestern Souss valley region], and the Rif Tarifit-speakers [in the 
Rif mountains of the North]). With most of their population secluded in largely 
inaccessible mountain ranges that are far from the urban political centers, the movement 
struggles to build and form a cohesive voice and to capitalize on their numbers.   
In Algeria there are four main geographic Amazigh groups (i.e., the Qbayil 
[Kabyle in the North], the Shawiyya [in the East], the Mazab [in the Northern Sahara] 
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and the Tuareg [in the deserts of far South]). For Algeria, though, the tradition of 
recalcitrance and defiance has always emanated from Kabyle (supported intellectually 
from diaspora in France). There are two main Tamazight dialects with several smaller 
ones spoken throughout the country:  Taqbaylit (5 million in Kabylie), Chaoui (2 million 
in the Shawiyya/Aurès region), and Tamzabit, Znati, Tachenouit, Tamesheq (throughout 
the country in 1–200, 000 person pockets).178   
It is only in the Kabyle region that this idea of geographic contiguity may be a 
factor of any real influence—ethnic consciousness (i.e., the awareness of a “set of beliefs, 
myths and cultural traits…that combine to establish a unique connectedness between 
people who identify themselves as [Imazighen]”) is considerably weaker in Algeria’s 
other three Amazigh regions.179  This ethnic awareness and identity, however, has not 
built into an ethnic nationalism.    
Of paramount importance is that neither movement has had census modification 
as a platform consideration. In Morocco this has been prevented by the king’s “we are all 
Berber’s decree”—while Mohammed VI’s proclamation may appear to be an altruistic 
one, it is not without ulterior motives—mainly the insulation of the government from 
charges of minority discrimination (after all, if every Moroccan is also Amazigh then the 
government could hardly be discriminatory against an entire population).  
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Figure 4.  Map of spoken languages (From Ethnologue, 2012) 
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A. THE HISTORICAL IMAZIGHEN 
The details of Amazigh history themselves that extend back centuries have only 
limited relevance to this thesis which focuses on state-movement interactions and 
outcomes. They are worth addressing in a cursory manner, though, because the study and 
analysis of them distinct from a monolithic Arab-Islamic history is a modern 
phenomenon and a critical part of the emerging Amazigh identity that espouses an 
ancient narrative and primordial connection amongst its members.180  Prior to the 1970s, 
there was no scholarship or recognition of the Amazigh within the broader narrative 
history of Algeria or Morocco. To the contrary, Arab nationalists belittled such ideas as 
colonial contrivances created to weaken independence efforts.   The national narrative in 
both countries largely portrayed the Imazighen as savages and the invading Arabs as 
righteous saviors who came proffering salvation and civilization. The only minor 
exception to this was in Morocco where the 11th to 14th century ruling dynasties were 
Amazigh ones (e.g., the Almohades from 1130–1269).181  Indeed much of their history 
has had to be “imagined”182 since its history has largely been an oral one and because it 
had also been suppressed by more than a millennium of Arab-Islamic rule.   There is then 
an inherent tension between movement proponents that seek to amalgamate this unique 
corporate memory and history that stands apart from the Arab-Islamic one and those that 
point out that it was the standardization of Arabic in Tamazgha that gave the Imazighen 
the ability to collect this history through the written word.183   
This is not to say there has been no historical scholarship about the Amazigh 
people. In the 10th century, King Bourghwata translated the Qu’ran into Tamazight, 
however, these translations were destroyed following the king’s defeat by Sunnis 
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invaders.184  In the fourteenth century, Tunisian scholar Ibn Khaldun wrote extensively 
about the history of the world and man in his ambitious The Muqadimmah: An 
Introduction to History. In this first volume he lays the foundation for a scientific 
approach to history, later dedicating the sixth volume to the history of the Imazighen. In 
his first volume, he recognizes the Imazighen role as original inhabitants and proprietors 
of North Africa, a group distinct from the conquering Arab forces: “since time 
immemorial, this human race—the Berbers—has populated the plains, the mountains, the 
plateau, the countryside and the towns of the Maghreb.”185  He describes a common 
Amazigh identity, attributing to them particular “group feelings” and “common descent” 
that have always resisted urbanization and clung to a nomadic desert existence.186   He 
further lauds their resistance and resilience against centuries long efforts by Arab 
dynasties at subjugation.187  Despite notions of group identity 600 years ago, it was not 
until the imposition of state Arabization policies that the movement galvanized in a 
modern sense.188   
As original inhabitants of North Africa, the Imazighen had long resisted external 
rule—fighting off the Romans, Vandals and Byzantines before gradually succumbing to 
invading Arab forces in the 7th century who used Islam as a unifying, and ultimately, a 
conquering device. Diaspora activists and intellectuals today cite the emergence of the 
Amazigh in world history as “Year One,” 943 BCE, when Libico-Amazigh Meshwesh 
tribal leader Sheshonk I began the “Libyan Dynasties” in Egypt. Their presence 
continued to a powerful one, captured in the heroic tales of second and third century BCE 
Amazigh Hellenic kingdom leaders like Jurgurtha who fought bravely (but 
unsuccessfully) against eventual Roman rule. Some descendants of these conquered 
Imazighen would emerge in the coming centuries as notable figures and thinkers, to 
include Septimus Severus—the first native African Roman Emperor who ruled in the 2nd 
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and 3rd centuries. Finally, they point out that even Christianity shares the roots of its 
church with the Imazighen—fourth century church father Saint Augustine’s mother 
herself was an Amazigh.189  
 The gradual centuries long Arab envelopment was not without compromises or 
setbacks from both sides. This tension is evident in one hadith that characterizes 
Imazighen as possessors of 69 of the 70 parts of wickedness.190  Ibn Khaldun reports that 
the Amazigh in the Maghrib revolted against their Islamic overlords no less than 12 times 
before finally embracing the religion and rule.191  Chief among these resistors was the 
heralded Amazigh queen known as Kahina who battled the Arab marauders during their 
initial century of invasion.192  While nearly all Amazigh people today embrace Islam as a 
part of their identity in a general sense, they practice it particularly, tending toward 
Sufism with an emphasis on the importance of marabouts and the veneration of saints 
and ancestors. Most Amazigh women enjoy more independence and freedom than their 
Arab counterparts as well—evidence of this seen in their traditional carnal hedra 
dance.193 
In the centuries following the Arab conquest both Morocco and Algeria came 
under the rule of several Islamic Amazigh dynasties.194  During the 11th to the 14th 
centuries, the Almoravids, the Almohads and the Marinids all ruled as Amazigh Islamic 
dynasties.195  The last Amazigh empire in Morocco came to an end in 1279.196  
A common historical criticism by opponents of the Tamazight language is that it 
is incompatible with the Islam and has no place in Islam’s history. There is, however, 
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credible research demonstrating that Tamazight has long been used in Moroccan 
governance, as well as Islamic worship and ceremonies. Furthermore, there is 
jurisprudence written in Tamazight (fikh) during a long period of the nation’s history. 
One notable example is that of Almoravid leader Yussef Ibn Tashfin, a man unable to 
speak Arabic, but still able to operate and execute his office as “commander of the 
faithful” speaking only in Tamazight197 
As the 20th century began, the Imazighen possessed all the elements of 
nationhood with the exception of a common codified language.198  In Morocco, poetry 
from the 1914–18 Ait Ndhir region reveals that the Imazighen felt a solidarity with the 
makhzen and viewed the French—the ‘Christians’ as invaders:  O red city! O Dar 
Debbibagh! The Makhzan is no more!/The Christians strut about there with total 
impunity/Cry for the fates of our cities: Fes, Meknes, Agourai, Sefrou and 
Tabadout!/Surely the Christians are the cause of our fall!199  
The French 1930 “Berber dahir” marks an important point in the movement’s 
history and has been misused by both sides.200 The 1939 publication of Algerian 
Amazigh poet and writer Jean Amrouche’s Chants Berbères de Kabylie signaled the 
emergence of Amazigh identity but only as one specific to their region—not the state at 
large.   It was an important countercurrent to the homogenous nationalism movement, 
though, and signaled an important transition from low to high culture for the Algerian 
Imazighen movement.201 
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B. THE INDEPENDENCE (TRIBAL) AMAZIGH 
1. Morocco. 
At independence, any advocates for Amazigh rights and recognition restrained the 
fervency of their cries in deference to the greater prevailing nationalist forces. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the king originally created the MP to cement his 
relationship with powerful leaders in the rural countryside (where the majority of the 
population lived at independence). Despite this ignominious origin, it has long enjoyed 
substantial Amazigh support. Aside from a pro-monarchy focus, its original platform in 
the years prior to its official formation called for the government to recognize Tamazight 
as an official language and to increase the power wielded by the Amazigh tribal 
councils.202  This platform amounted to hollow rhetoric in the years following, however, 
with MP a member of the 1965 royalist coalition government that passed the Arabization 
law that year.203  
Amazigh support, however, did not rest solely in the MP. The left-leaning UNFP 
(a breakaway party from the PI) pulled in the support of many younger Amazigh urban 
workers and intellectuals. They felt that with a socialist vision for Morocco’s future, they 
could combat the established entrenchment of the powerful and rich Fassis families and 
cast off the tribal constraints of their Amazigh heritage. Intellectually this also implied 
the demise of the monarchy, however, in practice their opposition stance usually 
defaulted to support of the king.204  The UNFP also pulled in the support of southern 
Amazigh businessmen (i.e., the Shleuh)—not for any ideological reasons—but due to 
their interests in besting competitor Fassis families and businesses.205 
The main thrust of Amazigh effort during this time period emanated from the role 
of the Amazigh tribal sheikhs who relished and amplified their power due to their 
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relationship with the king. Their focus was (understandably) on maintaining power and 
stature in competition with powerful Fassis and urban bourgeoisie.206 In the decade 
following independence, that the executive seat would be filled by a king was not a 
given. The absolute power he enjoys today comes only as a product of decades of 
constant manipulation and careful alliance building after independence.207 
The king’s 1958 dahir allowing for the freedom of association (meant to speed up 
MP formation) enabled a substantial rise in the number of cultural associations in 
following decades, especially those dedicated to promoting awareness of the Amazigh 
identity and its rightful place in the nation’s history.208  The sole tangible activist 
byproduct in the 1960s came in 1967 when Imazighen, weary of the secular left-wing’s 
growing promotion of a uniform pan-Arab identity, founded the Moroccan Association of 
Research and Cultural Exchange (AMREC) in Rabat. Notable and indicative of a 
reticence to place any outward emphasis of a distinct Amazigh identity was the 
conspicuous absence of any Amazigh terminology in the cultural association’s name.209   
2. Algeria. 
At independence in Algeria, Amazigh freedom fighters in the FLN (largely from 
Kabyle and Aurès) struggled for a voice and place amidst an urban Arab nationalist-
controlled government with little patience for dissenting views or identities. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, many key Amazigh figures (those that survived the war against 
the French) would meet murderous ends in the years following independence. Ben 
Bella’s recruitment of numerous Amazigh notables into the ruling leadership temporarily 
stifled any opposition voices and also placated the constituents under these leaders 
(Amazigh held five of the nineteen ministerial positions in Ben Bella’s first 
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government).210  Soon growing disillusioned with Ben Bella’s leadership, Ait Ahmed 
formed the FFS and would lead Kabyle guerilla forces against the government. From 
1962–63 these Kabyle Imazighen revolted against the FLN, angered by their 
maltreatment after fighting so valiantly during the revolution.211  Despite their military 
prowess, these efforts were far outmatched by the political prowess of Ben Bella and his 
sycophants. The FFS actions were further hampered by the opposition of half of National 
Assembly’s Kabyle deputies who issued a declaration that “there is no Kabyle problem; 
Kayblia is a region like any other in the country.”212  This defeat led to the FFS’s 
abolishment and left no party to represent the specific needs of the Imazighen. In two 
later iterations, Ben Bella would keep only three Amazigh in ministerial positions.213  
After Boumediene’s 1965 coup, he would take a more pragmatic approach, appointing 
five Imazighen to the Revolutionary Council (twenty percent being the Amazigh 
population proportion by his calculation). He would also attempt to quell Amazigh 
opposition through investment in the economic infrastructure of Kabye and Aurès. These 
efforts coupled with French remaining the lingua franca within the government (and a 
language spoken most fluently and widely by the Kabyles), provided very little impetus 
for anyone to risk imprisonment or censure by mobilizing or protesting.214  The 
incentives would change, however, at the close of the 1960s with the acceleration of 
Arabization policies in Algeria. 
In 1967 the Berber Academy was created in Paris and was renamed two years 
later as the Berber Academy Agraw Imazighen. It was—and would remain—an 
organization dominated by a largely diaspora elite. This Academy would be instrumental 
in encouraging the rapid growth of Amazigh cultural groups in Paris beginning in the late 
1960s. During this time period the Berber Studies Group (GEB) also emerged with a 
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largely cultural (vice political) agenda. The MCB also emerged in 1968 advocating for a 
multi-cultural Algeria—they would grow to be the most important opposition voice 
within the Algeria before the rise of Islamist power.215  
C. THE MODERN AMAZIGH: THE AMAZIGH IDENTITY MOVEMENT  
1. 1970s and Globalization 
The rise of identity politics in the 1970s marked the political instrumentalization 
of ethnic culture at large. On both sides of the debate, the rise of ethnic nationalism in the 
international arena by formerly ignored minority groups produced a steep learning curve 
for those in power that would collide frequently with sweeping Arabization policies in 
the coming decades.216    
In Algeria, economic conditions drove large numbers of the residents from the 
mountains of Kabyle to the urban centers. Ideologically, this rural to urban migration 
joined a poor rural populace with an intellectual Kabyle elite resulting in a growing 
realization of ethnic identity. Practically this movement enabled a more fluid social 
ladder and drove an increase in Kabyle emigration (46% of all Algerians abroad by 1980 
came from Kabyle).217  This emigration in turn created a European Amazigh diaspora 
that formed the ideological and intellectual backbone for the movement. 
During this time period, “Vive la Kabylie” emerged as a symbol of this growing 
ethnic consciousness in the midst of a country’s economic largesse was so unequally 
distributed. Other central social figures rising in popularity were poet and scholar 
Mouloud Mammeri and poet and author Kateb Yacine.218  Yacine fought to counter the 
government-sponsored narrative of Algeria’s history and identity as solely an Arab-
Islamic one. Prevalent among the growing blooming of Amazigh culture was the 
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impressive “New Kabyle Song” occurrence.219  Other key events include the 1973 
publication of the first Amazigh bulletin by the University of Paris VIII GEB.   
A portion of Morocco’s Berber/Amazigh Manifesto would capture much of the 
movements’ sentiment in both countries regarding their rejection of Arabic as the only 
language that should be able to operate within the broader Islamic context. They point to 
the words of the rightly-guided Caliph (and son-in-law to the prophet Muhammed) Ali 
and his encouragement to embrace languages other than Arabic: 
A person is “Arab” or “non-Arab” by his language. As for the Imâm Ali 
(may Allah honor him), he urged the Arabs to learn languages because 
their knowledge increases intelligence and the ability to apprehend human 
characters. He said: “Learn languages! Each language represents a human-
being!”220 
 
Figure 5.  Arab-Berber Ethnic Map (After Leclerc, 2006). 
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In Morocco, the political turbulence of the 1970s (i.e., the multiple coup attempts 
on Hassan II) proved beneficial for the movement. The king’s focus on maintaining 
power meant that Amazigh cultural associations were not targeted and were allowed to 
flourish as long as they stifled any aspirations of ethnic or linguistic political mobility. 
Groups such as the AMREC accelerated their efforts in capturing, promoting and 
distributing Amazigh cultural history, traditions and folklore out of offices in Rabat and 
Paris.221  In 1978, l’Union du Peuple Amazighen was established.222  That same year, a 
former AMREC member founded the Tamaynunt Association that focused on elevating 
the notion of a specific Amazigh identity.223 
2. Multiculturalism and IRCAM in Morocco 
Activist movements in an authoritarian system typically must behave differently 
and operate much more carefully than those in a liberal democracy. Both governments 
ban political parties based on ethnic identity of religious affiliation, although political 
parties as an actor have only limited power to begin with.224  For the Amazigh organic 
movements (i.e., those originating within each country) this means that most must focus 
on language rights since it is one of the few “safe” topics that can be addressed and 
advocated for.225  This advocacy for language rights has practical applications, however, 
since one major concern is the incorporation and appropriate use of Tamazight at 
government institutions such as hospitals and other social services in regions that cater to 
heavily Amazigh populations.226 
In 1991 the MCA was created with a major aim to push for secularization and to 
combat forced Arabization.227  That same year a group of Amazigh associations banded 
together and issued the Agadir Charter on Language and Cultural Rights (le Charte 
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d’Agadir); this document demanded the creation of a national institute and the 
recognition of Tamazight as an official language.228   The charter captured a broader call 
by middle-class urban activists to battle back against government-sponsored “cultural 
marginalization” and to assert that Morocco’s character, narrative, history and policies 
should reflect its vital Amazigh component.229 While this call may not have been 
embraced by the rural Imazighen who were preoccupied with more pressing immediate 
economic needs, it stood as an important challenge to the state-sponsored status quo.230 
This pressure built and provoked a public outcry when several Amazigh activists 
in Morocco were jailed, beaten and convicted for publicly trumpeting their Amazigh 
identity. The poor publicity surrounding the episode shamed the palace leadership into 
capitulation— garnering a public pledge from Hassan II that all Moroccan dialects 
(lahjat) would be taught in schools.231  Of course even this pledge embodied a 
backhanded compliment of sorts. A pledge from the King that Tamazight would be 
taught in schools was, of course, a positive step but calling Tamazight a dialect most 
certainly denigrated its significance as a distinct and particular language standing apart 
from that of Arabic or darija.  
Much of the following years in the 1990s proved not to be a struggle against the 
monarchy but against the rising influence of Islamism. In 1999, Johadi Lhoucine 
attempted to translate the Qu’ran into Tamazight but Islamists thwarted his efforts, 
earning him the attention of the government which forbade such work until they later 
recanted their ban in 2003.232  On the surface this may be viewed as an overreaction by 
the government, however, certain complexities exist. A common accusation leveled at the 
dissenters is that the Qu’ran has been translated into many foreign languages without 
Islamic protest. The Islamists response and rationalization is illustrative of their mindset. 
They first point out that in these other countries, the primary population wasn’t Arab 
and/or Muslim. Adding to their argument they point out that in Muslim countries like 
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Pakistan, Turkey and Syria, the Qu’ran was translated into official state languages—not 
tribal dialects.233   Such reasoning is also likely behind the Islamists’ reticence at 
Tamazight being recognized as an official state language.    
In March 2000, 250 scholars, artists and businessmen signed a petition penned by 
Amazigh notable Mohammed Chafik calling on the state to recognize the Imazighen as a 
distinctive group and codify (in some measure) their respect for Tamazight and Amazigh 
culture in general. Overall, this Amazigh manifesto charged that slights and 
discrimination against Amazigh are slights against all of Morocco. Their manifesto 
trumpeted nationhood as a more primordial construct in that they place the origin 
Morocco’s nationhood as one occurring prior the Arab invasion. In all, the lengthy and 
verbose manifesto made nine central demands234: 
• The Amazigh nature of every Moroccan must be openly and freely 
debated at the national level. The “alternance” government is ideally 
positioned to moderate with the Prime Minister as the leader. 
• A constitutional recognition of Tamazight as an official and national 
language. 
• Government-sponsored economic affirmative action policies to be 
implemented on a temporary basis—focused on infrastructure, agriculture, 
industry, education and training—to bring them on par with the rest of the 
nation. 
• Enforce the teaching of Tamazigh at all levels of the education system. 
Government support for the scientific study of the language to enable 
competent teaching of it. 
• Creation of a “national scientific commission” to develop a Moroccan 
(and maghribian) history syllabus that includes and recognizes (not 
denigrates) the role of the Imazighen. This commission shall operate apart 
from and independently from the ministers of education. 
• Institutionalize Tamazight within the public sphere to include: radio/tv, 
judicial system, public administration, health care system, local/regional 
government. Train and employ Tamazight translators and interpreters to 
ensure equal access and use for all citizens. End ban (whether official or 
not) on registration of Amazigh names in State Registry.   
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• The rehabilitation of Amazigh arts (i.e., literature, dancing, singing, 
architecture and ecoration) and equality of access and funding within the 
government (to a level on par with Arab peers). 
• Recognition of historical and given Amazigh names for locations (i.e., 
villages, cities and regions) in the nation instead of their replacement with 
Arabic ones due to arbitrary Arabization. Rightful prioritization of 
Amazigh notables when naming public institutions (e.g., El-Khattabi is 
last on the list for avenue names). 
• Qualification of Amazigh cultural associations for official state financial 
assistance.   Equal financial assistance for publications promoting 
Amazigh heritage of Morocco as is received by ones in Arabic and 
French. 
The manifesto ends by urging unity with their Arab countrymen:   
We, the Amazighes, are brothers to the Arabs, wherever they live, owing 
to (a) our belonging to the Islamic “Umma” (Nation), (b) the strong ties 
which bond us to them, and (c) our shared history, characterized by mutual 
support in good and bad days. We share with them their hopes and pains 
and stand by their side in any just cause. As for our fellow citizens who 
are proud of their “Arabity,” just as we are likewise proud of our 
“Amazighity,” we jointly form one body. None of us - be it from them or 
from us – should pride himself with his lineage, because reliance on 
conceit is a proof for indolence and a deviant way to get preeminence, 
honor and wealth without making any effort nor laboring for them.235 
Generally these activists espouse a pro-monarchy stance citing that Amazigh were 
members of several Moroccan dynasties. This stance, of course, makes them an attractive 
partner for the palace.236  This partnership hinges on the short memory of much of the 
movement in ignoring the historical slights and brutality perpetrated by the monarchy.237  
It also, however, is predicated on realist calculus that recognizes the limits of an 
authoritarian system as well as the necessity of cooperation with the king. 
While IRCAM is a state creation and viewed by some as a state co-optation of 
their movement, for some it represents the movement’s “foothold” within the state 
apparatus. For now though, it remains as only a foothold since the true power for the 
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implementation of IRCAM recommendations lies within the Ministry of Education.238  It 
can also be seen as North Africa’s first foray into multi-culturalism.239 
From 2002 to 2003, the Amazigh movement fiercely debated which script (i.e., 
Latin, Arabic or Tifinagh) would be used within Morocco. This standardization was an 
important step in consolidating a movement frequently splintered by various dialects and 
without a common medium for communication. It was also a necessary step in order to 
teach Tamazight in schools. Proponents for the Latin script (generally the urban activists 
and diaspora) argued that this modern script would provide a better medium for 
communication at the global level and online. Others argued that Arabic was already 
being used within Morocco and the government. This was also the view of Islamists 
opponents. Critics of this rationale responded that few rural inhabitants could speak or 
write the classical Arabic that was used by the major middle eastern media outlets. 
Finally, IRCAM’s official stance (largely the monarchy’s stance) argued that Tifinagh 
provided the script most historically faithful to Tamazight (and still used by Tuaregs in 
the Sahel); it also offered a potential future bridge to connect other Amazigh groups in 
North Africa.240  This bridge is an unlikely one though with the Kabylie having long 
adopted a modified Latin script.241  Ultimately, the king followed the IRCAM 
recommendation, a move that many view as proof of the incestuous relationship between 
the IRCAM and the palace. By choosing Tifinagh, implementation within the rural 
education system must go slowly as there is a dearth of teachers able to teach the ancient 
script.242 This slow pace created further alienation prompting seven IRCAM leaders to 
resign in 2005 due to a lack of any measurable progress.243 
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Figure 6.  Tamazight dialect Map (From Nuala Cowan, 2012) 
By 2005, Amazigh activism through cultural associations flourish with over 300 
of them falling under the MCA umbrella.244  However, as these associations still had to 
get permission from their local government to meet; this implied monitoring and 
oversight is an obstacle to effective mobilization and advocacy. Furthermore, in contrast 
to Algeria (where rural-based associations have much higher female participation) most 
of the members of these associations tend to be literate and educated elite males.245   
The Amazigh Network for citizenship (AZETTA) espouses a platform focused on 
“democracy, secularism and liberalism.”246  They—as well as the MCA and OADL—
have worked in concert with the General Assembly Human Rights Council of the United 
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Nations (UN) to advocate for shortcomings in government recognition and application of 
constitutional laws toward the Imazighen. Under Section 12 (Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples) of the UN council’s March 2012 report, several obstacles to progress were 
highlighted. These included: persistent inequality between Arabic and Tamazight due to 
unclear language in Article 5 of the Constitution (whether deliberate or otherwise, 
continued marginalization of the Amazigh culture, rights and language, the torture and 
wrongful imprisonment of Amazigh activists, and the subpar national platform given to 
promoters of Amazigh culture and identity.247 
Overall, the movement sees secularization as a key component to the 
advancement of democracy and not necessarily as an idea exclusive of or undermining 
Islam.248  Islamists, of course, see aspirations of secularism as mutually exclusive and 
unacceptable within a Muslim state. 
In Morocco, poverty has always been prevalent and the nation’s destitute 
traditionally had few, if any, recourses for action or mobilization tools. This meant that 
for much of the time impoverished Imazighen didn’t view their ethnicity as an instrument 
of any kind. With 50% of all Moroccans living in rural areas and of those 40–45% of 
them speaking Tamazight as their first language, this sapped their ability to mobilize 
effectively.249  At the small town, rural level, Moroccan identity is more closely tied to a 
local particular identity. A local village or tribe’s ceremonies and groups bind them 
firmly within their day-to-day routine. Thus, their day-to-day language grievances stem 
from a lack of access to basic social and health services because Tamazight is not 
incorporated into Moroccan institutions.250  It is only in the major urban areas, that this 
identity expands to the international (e.g., Amazigh speakers and musicians from other 
countries). Technology, however, has begun to change these same people’s identity and 
awareness. In other words, they no longer see themselves as just “poor” but instead are 
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beginning to view themselves as “poor and Berber.”  This new rural awareness coupled 
with the long-standing anger of unemployed urbanites may produce radicalization in the 
future if unaddressed.251 
3. Algeria’s Berber Spring and beyond 
With a more repressive regime, much of the Amazigh resistance in Algeria was 
created and supported by the diaspora in France. Throughout the 1980s more than half of 
all Algerian émigrés were Amazigh.252  Within Algeria’s borders themselves, Amazigh 
resistance and protest continues to stem from where it is most concentrated—in Kabyle.   
The Amazigh movement in Algeria used two different political parties (the RCD and FFS 
as discussed in the previous chapter) and one association (the MCB) to struggle for two 
goals: state democratization and the inclusion of Tamazight and Amazigh culture as 
essential tenets of Algerian identity. Much of the movement’s galvanization in this era 
stemmed from the decades of linguistic and cultural repression by successive regimes. A 
generation of Kabyle students had grown up in schools where they were physically 
beaten if they even spoke Tamazight—all this while the Algerian elite preached 
Arabization and then sent their children to expensive French schools.253  Analysis is 
further complicated by the deep connection between the Amazigh elite and France (as 
well as with the French language). With much of the movement’s intellectual vision 
coming from the diaspora in Paris, Imazighen do not all consider the French language 
and Algerian identity and pride as antithetical.254  This viewpoint, of course, runs in stark 
contrast with Arabization.  
On 10 March 1980, the governor of Kabyle cancelled an Amazigh poetry reading 
by Mouloud Mammeri in Tizi Ouzou, an intellectual and commercial Amazigh 
stronghold. This action (and the government’s decision four months earlier to speed up 
Arabization in the education system) led to protests in Tizi Ouzou but also ones by 
students at the University in Algiers, prompting more widespread protests throughout 
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Kabylie that lasted for nearly two months. All of this dissent provoked an over vigilant 
government response that allegedly killed 30–50 Amazigh protesters that month. This 
government’s overreaction was further magnified by their lackadaisical attitude toward 
Arabist protests taking place at the University of Algiers during the same time period.255  
This violence only served to motivate and solidify the movement in Kabyle, especially at 
the elite level. In this case, the actions of a largely student-led movement resulted in the 
establishment of a chair of Kabyle studies at Tizi Ouzou University and the reinstatement 
of one at Algiers University—two cultural outcomes. This outpouring of protests became 
known as the “Berber Spring” or tafsut Imazighen.256   It also marked a turning point for 
the movement, as their pro-democracy, pro-reform, counter-regime rhetoric would grow 
increasingly salient in the coming decades.257  It is likely that a contributing factor to this 
mass protests was that the first wave of Kabyles to endure the educational Arabization 
process had come of age in 1980.258 
In 1981 more student protests erupted in the springtime commemoration of the 
“Berber Spring.”  This yearly celebration and remembrance remains a poignant mobilizer 
and concrete evidence of the psychocultural importance of community events such as 
parades and festivals. These yearly protests, the flourishing of the New Kabyle song 
genre and Amazigh poetry were indicative of the widening of the Amazigh movement 
from an elite-based one to one that connected to and was more relevant to the wider 
Amazigh community at large.259 
When political associations were allowed to form at the local level was an 
important step. Their basic goals were the promotion of Amazigh language and culture 
but also on a personal (local) level to instill a sense of pride (instead of shame) in the 
rural traditions.260  
When the government opened up the political system in 1989, the myriad Kabyle 
associations attempted to mobilize politically but were far outmatched by the politically 
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well-organized Islamists.261  The government’s political clampdown in response to 
Islamist success at the polls would spark a civil war lasting over a decade—one that 
effectively hampered any meaningful moves forward for the Amazigh movement. Only 
as the war drifted into its aftermath was there any real opportunity at the start of the 21st 
century. This is not to say that there was no progress during this time—by the summer of 
1989, 154 cultural associations had sprouted up in Kabyle with many more in the 
extending villages. 
While many of the leading Islamists came from the Kabyle region, one should not 
infer from this a meaningful connection or cooperation between the Kabyle Amazigh and 
the Algerian Islamists. The active role of some Kabyle Imazighen in the Islamist 
movement stems more from the Islamist use of the region’s economic destitution as a 
motivator (or instrument) for mobilization against the authoritarian Algerian regime.262  
When the Islamists’ efforts ultimately failed (at least for that time period), these same 
inhabitants would turn to ethnicity as a mobilizing tool for regime change. As a cultural 
movement demanding recognition of a diverse and different identity, the Kabyle 
Imazighen struggle is antithetically opposed to Algerian Islamists’ monolithic and 
uncompromising nature. Furthermore, some of the more militant Amazigh militants don’t 
view their struggle as a social one but instead as a civic one. Thus, it is readily apparent 
that simply sharing similar grievances against the government doesn’t imply cooperation 
or a shared worldview.263 
The complaints and vision of the Kabyles was captured politically within the FFS 
and the RCD. Led by Hocine Ait Ahmed, the FFS’ primary focus was on a national 
pluralist and democratic platform—during the decade of civil strife they encouraged 
dialogue with the Islamists. This was in stark juxtaposition with the Sa’id Sa’ai’s 
stringently secular RCD that supported the government’s violent battles against the 
Islamists.264  Activists were able to organize en masse in 1991, to protest the Arabization 
law passed that year.265 
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The MCB announced a general strike on 24 September 1994 to express their 
anger at the government’s treatment of Amazigh populace; this strike effectively shut 
down the schools in Kabyle. Six months later, this extended strike as well as the Amazigh 
spring parades, proved pivotal in forcing the government to meet with Amazigh leaders 
and their subsequent creation of the High Commission for Amazighity (HCA)—the body 
responsible for the introduction of Tamazight instruction within the Algerian education 
system—on 28 May 1995.266  The regime’s concession came from a quid pro quo 
relationship in which the movement supported the regime against the Islamists.267  
In November 1996, the parliament passed a constitutional amendment recognizing 
Amazigh identity in Algeria but stopped short of recognizing their language despite 
pressure from the HCA.268  That Tamazight was finally be taught in the schools did serve 
to inspire Imazighen hoping for further recognition, as captured in the lines of Kabyle 
poet Lounis Ait Menguellet from that time period: “Oh, Kabyle language, Your sun has 
risen, your day will come.”269 
In the summer of 1998, the GIA assassinated noted Amazigh singer Lounes 
Matoub who sang out and criticized Islamists who “used religion to paint Algeria 
Arabic.”   He so ardently opposed educational Arabization that he never learned any 
Arabic while in school with the excuse that: “j’avais du mal a comprendre l’arabe” (i.e., 
“I was bad at understanding Arabic”).270  While his murder motivated as many as 
100,000 protesters, their cries failed to garner any significant government concessions or 
protections.271  
The 2001 killing of 18 year-old Massinissa Guermah while in police custody 
prompted a public outrage to which the regime responded violently, leaving at least 80 
people dead. These April protests stretched into the summer and beyond Kabyle setting 
off government security forces on a spree of torture and murder that left at least a 
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hundred more people dead. This “Black Spring” proved influential in pressuring the 
government to make Tamazight a national language in 2002.272  They also marked a 
departure from the Imazighen embrace of the FFS and RCD as instruments to effect 
change. This abandonment of the traditional political parties was a reversion to a more 
ancient practice of representation and action through the aarouch (old village hierarchical 
structure). This shift in focus eventually became the 2001 El-Kseur platform—one that 
mainly focused on social and economic issues (but also ones specific to the Imazighen). 
President Bouteflika attempted to deflect their momentum by promising to recognize the 
Tamazight as both an official and national language (only one of the 15 tenets in their 
platform).   This success was overshadowed by the state’s lack of response to the other 14 
points in the platform, one of them notably the demand for the withdrawal of the 
gendarmerie from Kabyle.   
This El-Kseur platform would eventually morph into the Citizens Movement.273  
This transition and the formation of the El-Kseur platform are an ideal example of ethnic 
mobilization occurring only after unaddressed widespread societal grievances.274  Thus, a 
part of a movement that consistently operated within the confines of a desire for civic 
nationalism transitioned to one of ethnic nationalism (and particularism) due to 
unaddressed grievances.   This transition, however, is not a uniform one at all and is only 
applicable to a minority of the movement.    
That contemporary minority is captured under the banner of the Movement for the 
Autonomy of Kabyle (MAK) and is illustrative of the radicalizing effects of government 
repression. Largely organized by the diaspora, it reflects a marked dissatisfaction with the 
minor advances of the 1980s and 1990s. Founded by Ait Bachir and led by singer Ferhat 
Mehenni, the MAK protests within Algeria are localized to Kabyle but this is also 
indicative of much of the Amazigh identity politics within Algeria. The MAK also 
represent a shift from the civic nationalism most prevalent with the larger Amazigh 
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movement to a more ethnic nationalism.275  More importantly it stands in stark contrast 
to the broader-based MCB with regard to its call for secularism above Islamic values. 
The core tenets of its platform call for the abolishment of shar’ia, relegation of religion to 
the private arena, and a liberal democracy.276 
The majority of the Algerian Amazigh movement remains a civic one that desires 
that Tamazight be “officially acknowledged and respected in the context of modern, 
democratic states in which individuals enjoy justice and full citizenship.”277  The 
dissatisfaction with the progress of the civic movement stems from the state’s inability to 
provide much of the social security that perhaps one’s ethnic (or political-religious group, 
as is the case with the Islamists) could provide. This gap between the regime and its 
people makes voices within the movement that push for ethnic nationalism all the more 
salient.278  Today, however, the idea that Kabyle Imazighen are a repressed minority 
joined by “blood ties, history, culture and language” remains the prevalent view only 
among the diaspora. As noted in this thesis, however, such degrees of identification are 
not static and remain largely governed by the state’s level of response. The prevailing 
view on state language policy is succinctly captured in the words of author Kateb Yacine:  
“[If I am an Arab, why Arabize me, and if I am not Arab, why Arabize me?]”279 
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Figure 7.  Map of Kabylie (From June 10, 2003 ICG Report) 
4. Pan-Berberism (Tamazgha): The Global Amazigh 
In the late 1990s, technology and globalization spurred a pan-Berber movement 
resulting in both physical and web-based manifestations—the Internet not as a causal 
factor but as an enabling mechanism. While globalization can sometimes destroy local 
differences for the cause of progress and interconnectedness, in the Amazigh case, it has 
allowed geographically disparate groups to virtually and intellectually congregate.280 
These efforts are hampered, though, by the differences in linguistic standardization. 
Attempts to standardize the Tamazight language only began in earnest 35 years ago and it 
continues to be a stove-piped effort without any real coordination across physical 
borders.281 
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 On the physical plane, the first World Amazigh Congress (WAC or CMA) 
convened in 1997. The WAC’s roots stem from a meeting of like minds during a 1994 
film festival held in Brittany.282  Founded the following year, this group of Amazigh 
leaders has meet irregularly since then with the last meeting taking place in 2008 in 
Meknes, Morocco. It is decidedly secular and pro-democratic and aligned more with 
western values politically. Following the attacks on 9–11, WAC Secretary-General 
Belcacem Lounes sent a letter to President Bush calling for the punishment of the 
attackers and for all those who espouse “human and democratic values” to band together 
to eliminates terrorists everywhere.283  The movement also supported U.S. action in Iraq, 
finding a kindred spirit in the Kurds and buoying a hope that Europe would pull its 
longtime support for the Algerian state. This organization is still a decidedly 
dysfunctional one as is evident by their outdated and infrequently updated website.284 
Today, Tamazgha has expanded beyond the physical notion of an ancient  
Amazigh land stretching from the Canary Islands to Egypt’s Siwa Oasis to a limitless 
online Amazigh globe (i.e., community).285  This virtual community emerged online with 
the advent of the Internet and the expansion of access (happening first among the 
diaspora in Europe who serve as the origin and base of most of these communities). As 
access to the Internet expands and cheapens, these groups increasingly meet Benedict 
Anderson’s description of an imagined community (i.e., a group of people espousing a 
common memory, history, culture and territory)286 but also in the sense that nearly 
everyone in these communities will never meet each other.287   
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D. CONCLUSION 
Dedicated scholarship on Amazigh movements in particular (versus general 
Amazigh roles in the political system) is a relatively new field. Previous older segmented 
and particular scholarship existed in French and Arabic but it never systematically and 
holistically addressed the historical Amazigh. Gabriel Camps’ 1980 work Les Berbères 
explores the ancient (i.e., before Christ) archeological and anthropological details of the 
Amazigh people but stops short of any attempt to address them within a modern political-
social context (nor was this his intent).288  It would be another sixteen years before the 
publication of a book in English that addressed the Imazighen from a general 
perspective.289  In 1996, Michael Brett (a historian) and Elizabeth Fentress (an 
archeologist) published The Berbers: The Peoples of North Africa.   Early on they point 
out that their book is the first of its kind in the English language—their bibliography is 
evidence of that—heavily populated with a diverse selections of French references. Their 
attempt, while laudable, devotes the lion’s share of its analysis to archeological and 
ancient historical exposition. Furthermore, they concentrate most on Tunisia and Algeria 
and then draw their observations to a close in the 1980s period and have not issued an 
updated edition since. As discussed in this thesis’ literature review, of course, Amazigh-
dedicated scholarship has since witnessed a marked rise in both quality and quantity 
(albeit still a relatively small community of credible Anglophone scholars). A large 
challenge then for the native Amazigh movement has been to incorporate and translate 
the varied analyses and historical studies of their own ethnic people into a modern 
context that acknowledges both their key role and distinct identity. Ultimately the 
Amazigh movements, in their various iterations, have struggled to broker an acceptable, 
distinct position (and identity) in two countries whose elite ruling class constantly strives 
to contain and balance an Islamic identity and an Arab history within the context of 
modernity.290  
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This chapter has shown the overall evolution within the Amazigh movement that 
diverged into two separate paths for the movements in Algeria and Morocco. The 
separation began with two very different and influential post-independence power 
outcomes. In Algeria, the nationalists emerged as the political victors who were able to 
control, direct and set government policy openly hostile to a distinct Amazigh identity in 
the name of Arab nationalism. These same—ideologically at least—nationalists in 
Morocco lost out with their party (i.e., the PI) effectively excluded from power and 
political influence beginning in the 1960s. This also meant that the role of Morocco’s 
Arab nationalism in relation to Amazigh particularism was tempered and mediated in the 
near omnipotent person of the king.291 
Geographically, the movement in Algeria has had a marked advantage (when 
compared to Morocco) in that any Kabyle action is typically viewed as emblematic of the 
greater Algerian Amazigh populace. The advantage of geographical concentration, 
however, limits their ideological efficacy as they struggle to build solidarity with other 
Algerian Amazigh groups. The majority of government concessions to the Imazighen 
aren’t distributed through the Amazigh regions but only in Kabyle. This limits the 
political appeal of Kabyle rhetoric to the Imazighen living outside their region.   In 
Morocco, there has been no base geographic stronghold on which the movement could 
build its foundation—its Amazigh populations spread out in remote, spread-out and 
inaccessible mountain ranges. These disperse population locales meant that the Moroccan 
Imazighen did not all hold the same corporate memory from the French colonial 
experience as in Kabylie (i.e., with regard to access to the French education system). 
They instead have had to maximize their urban influence and economic means to exert 
influence.292  Central to this has been the challenge of balancing the extent of their 
demands with the attractive and frequent co-optive terms the monarchy.   
Despite legislative lethargy and constitutional setbacks from each state’s 
institutions, the movements have been effective in transforming the manner and the level 
at which the state must addresses the concept of a distinct Amazigh identity. This 
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transformation has been a monumental step since the movements’ independence origins. 
During the waves of Arab and Islamic nationalism dating from independence in both 
countries, Amazigh culture had amounted to little more than a historical “residue” or 
oddity that each state’s leadership believed to belong firmly in the domain of simple 
backward rural festivals and folklore.293  While this type of cultural third-class 
citizenship still exists (especially among the Islamists) it is no longer the default 
mentality for government and society at large.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Sixty years ago the idea of a distinct and vibrant Amazigh identity existing in 
Algeria and Morocco would have been roundly rebuffed as far-fetched and unrealistic. In 
the countries themselves, such assertions would have been decried as unpatriotic and 
traitorous. Today, Amazigh culture and language is accepted and acknowledged in both 
states, albeit at varying levels.   This path has been a hard-fought one, though, gained one 
small incremental step forward at a time.   
In both Algeria and Morocco, the state’s institutions were overwhelmingly the 
most influential factor with regard to Amazigh outcomes and shaped by their 
instrumental leaders. These ensuing institutional concessions came only after domestic or 
international pressure that threatened the established power structure (i.e, the makhzen or 
le Pouvoir). A key difference in these two structures, though, is in the executive branch. 
Because a hereditary king sits in the executive seat in Morocco and that nation itself has a 
continuous dynastic monarchic history, the executive possesses a historical legitimacy 
that is uncontested and indeed constitutionally unquestionable. A descendent of the 
Alawite dynasty dating from the 1600s, the Moroccan king carries the title “commander 
of the faithful” due to his status as a sharif (i.e., a descendent of the prophet Muhammed). 
Algeria does not have this same history or security in the seat of their executive branch; 
therefore, its president is forced to maintain power and legitimacy through both his 
position as well as his stature in contrast to the parliament. For the Algerian president, 
whether shams or not, two different elections have to be managed and manipulated (i.e., 
at the national and local level).   
While a secondary influence, the Amazigh movements played an important role in 
taking advantage of institutional political openings—whether due to Islamist mobilization 
or liberalization periods—to shape the dialogue at a local, national and global level. A 
major shortcoming for both movements has been the absence of census modification 
from their platform. This addition would certainly enhance the legitimacy of their 
grievances and their salience on the global stage. Notably, this modificaiton should not be 
 86 
limited to self-identified ethnicity but should also include all languages and dialects 
spoke. 
Morocco’s comparatively peaceful independence experience set its nation on path 
less prone to reactions of blatant violence and outright repression (with notable 
exceptions occurring during the villainous tyranny of Minister of Interior Driss Basri and 
then Crown Prince Hassan II’s brutality during the 1958–59 Rif Rebellions) toward 
opposing minority voices.294  Instead, the Moroccan regime established a clear pattern of 
co-optation as a strategy by which to deal with threats to the established power structure. 
This strategy, in turn, influenced and formed an accommodating more passive movement. 
Algeria, by contrast, paid a steep and bloody price for their independence from its 
French colonial master. The ensuing power vacuum at independence produced a fevered 
struggle to consolidate power—both personally and institutionally.   This severity would 
be emblematic of the Algerian pattern of response to dissent within its borders over the 
coming century. While this pattern of severity was often initially effective in stymieing 
attempts at mobilization, in the long term, it pushed the Amazigh movement within its 
borders toward a more radical path.   
Today in Algeria, the Kabyle Imazighen have achieved more autonomy at the 
local level and have their own political party. This progress has failed to extend between 
their mountains—leaving the movement at a national level disjointed and largely 
impotent. In the future, two outcomes are likely to occur: increased measures of 
autonomy or even independence for Kabylie and recognition of the Amazigh identity as 
an integral part of the Algerian identity with the appropriate cultural and political 
outcomes.295  Continued regime repression, however, could further radicalize mainstream 
movement members and drive them toward extreme organization like the MAK—or 
more likely—push them towards violent actions against an un-invested power structure. 
This path could either put them in partnership with or conflict (more likely) the rising 
Islamist tide. The best strategy in Algeria may be to frame their movement as only a 
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cultural one and stay far removed from any ethnic nationalism rhetoric or ideology. This 
could enable them to broaden their base and galvanize the population at large against a 
regime unable to provide for its populace despite economic hydrocarbon largesse.296  
In Morocco today, there are over 300 Amazigh schools open, six papers published 
in Tamazight, and the long established right to create cultural associations (albeit heavily 
monitored ones).   Their efforts to form their own political party (the PDAM), however, 
have been continually thwarted (the latest attempt occurring in 2007). As discussed, 
though, Amazigh participation in the February 20th movement yielded tangible 
concessions from the regime with the constitutional recognition of their Tamazight as an 
official language. The gap between recognition and the practical application of that 
official acknowledgement remains a wide one that will continue to be exploited by a king 
focused more the retention and continued consolidation of personal power than sincerely 
addressing minority grievances.      
In this evaluation of the saliency of the state’s power to affect outcomes for the 
Imazighen versus the power of Amazigh movements themselves, one finds few direct 
intersections. Due to the structure of the political system in both states, ethnically-based 
movements are excluded by design from the process. This means that the movements 
most often advocate for culture concessions although they truly desire legal and political 
end states.   The Amazigh struggle is captured succinctly in the following observation 
from the Berber Manifesto: “The harshest persecution is the one practiced under the wing 





                                                
296 Casper Wuite, “The Politics of Identity,” Fair Observer, August 4, 2012, 
http://www.fairobserver.com/article/politics-identity-berber-spring-algeria. 
297 “Berber Manifesto” 
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APPENDIX A. PLATFORM OF DEMANDS FOLLOWING 
MEETING (11 JUNE 2011) IN EL-KSEUR   
We, the representatives of the wilayas of Sétif, Bordj Bou-Arreridj, Bouira, 
Boumerdès, Bgayet, TiziOuzou and Algiers, together with the Combined Committee of 
the universities of Algiers, meeting this day, Monday, 11 June 2001 at the Mouloud 
Feraoun Youth Club of El-Kseur (Bgayet), have adopted the following common platform 
of demands: 
• For the state to provide urgent care to all injured victims and the families 
of the martyrs of repression killed during the events. 
• For the civil courts to prosecute all the authors, organisers and secret 
sponsors of crimes and for them to be expelled from the security services 
and public office. 
• For the status of martyr to be granted to every victim of dignity during the 
events, and protection given to all witnesses of the crimes. 
• For the immediate departure of gendarmerie brigades and reinforcements 
of the Republican Security Units. 
• For legal proceedings against all demonstrators to be dropped, and for the 
acquittal of those already tried during the events. 
• For the immediate end to punitive raids, intimidation and provocation of 
the population. 
• Dissolution of the commissions of inquiry set up by the regime. 
• Satisfaction of the Amazigh claim in all its (identity, civilisational, 
linguistic and cultural), dimensions, without a referendum or any 
conditions, and the consecration of Tamazight as the official national 
language. 
• For a state that guarantees all socio-economic rights and democratic 
freedoms. 
• Against the policies of under-development, pauperisation and reduction to 
vagrancy of the Algerian people. 
• The placing of all executive functions of the state and the security corps 
under the authority of democratically-elected bodies. 
• For an emergency socio-economic program for the entire Kabylie region. 
• Against tamheqranit (hogra) and all forms of injustice and exclusion. 
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• For a case-by-case re-scheduling of regional exams for pupils unable to sit 
them. 
• Introduction of unemployment benefit of 50 per cent the value of the 
guaranteed national minimum wage 
• We demand an immediate and public official response to this platform of 
demands 
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APPENDIX B. SUCESSION OF RULE FOR ALGERIA AND 
MOROCCO 
Morocco 
Mohammed V  November 1927 - August 1953 
   August 1957  - February 1961 
Hassan II  February 1961  - July 1999 
Mohammed VI July 1999  - Present 
Algeria 
Ahmed Ben Bella September 1963 - June 1965 
Houari Boumediene June 1965  - December 1976 
   December 1976 - December 1978 
Rabah Bitat  December 1978 - December 1979 
Chadi Benjedid February 1979  - January 1992 
Mohamed Boudiaf January 1992  - June 1992 
Ali Kafi  July 1992  - January 1994 
Liamine Zeroual January 1994  -  November 1995 
   November 1995 - February 1997 
   February 1997  - April 1999 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika April 1999  - Present 
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APPENDIX C. 2000 BERBER MANIFESTO DEMANDS 
• The Amazigh nature of every Moroccan must be openly and freely 
debated at the national level. The “alternance” government is ideally 
positioned to moderate with the Prime Minister as the leader. 
• A constitutional recognition of Tamazight as an official and national 
language. 
• Government-sponsored economic affirmative action policies to be 
implemented on a temporary basis—focused on infrastructure, agriculture, 
industry, education and training—to bring them on par with the rest of the 
nation. 
• Enforce the teaching of Tamazigh at all levels of the education system. 
Government support for the scientific study of the language to enable 
competent teaching of it. 
• Creation of a “national scientific commission” to develop a Moroccan 
(and maghribian) history syllabus that includes and recognizes (not 
denigrates) the role of the Imazighen. This commission shall operate apart 
from and independently from the ministers of education. 
• Institutionalize Tamazight within the public sphere to include: radion/tv, 
judicial system, public administration, health care system, local/regional 
government. Train and employ Tamazight translators and interpreters to 
ensure equal access and use for all citizens. End ban (whether official or 
not) on registration of Amazigh names in State Registry.   
• The rehabilitation of Amazigh arts (i.e., literature, dancing, singing, 
architecture and ecoration) and equality of access and funding within the 
government (to a level on par with Arab peers). 
• Recognition of historical and given Amazigh names for locations (i.e., 
villages, cities and regions) in the nation instead of their replacement with 
Arabic ones due to arbitrary Arabization. Rightful prioritization of 
Amazigh notables when naming public institutions (e.g., El-Khattabi is 
last on the list for avenue names). 
• Qualification of Amazigh cultural associations for official state financial 
assistance.   Equal financial assistance for publications promoting 
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